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Abstract
Consumer stockpiling is a crucial retail phenomenon that has received wide aca-
demic attention. However, some related issues still remain unaddressed, with
implications for many areas of economics policy. By focusing on consumer stock-
piling, this thesis provides four theoretical essays to better understand these topics.
The first essay analyses the implications for demand elasticities. It proposes a
general foundation to understand how empirical estimates of own- and cross-price
elasticities of demand can be biased when the effects of consumer stockpiling are
not fully considered. It suggests that both the own- and cross-price elasticity biases
can be positive, negative, or zero depending upon intuitive theoretical conditions.
The second essay then places more structure on the above-mentioned general
framework by developing a duopoly model of stockpiling with differentiated products.
Within this model, the results show that the equilibrium measures of the own- and
cross-price elasticity biases are both (weakly) positive. This essay then analyses
when such biases matter most.
The third essay considers market entry. It introduces consumer stockpiling beha-
viour into an n-firm oligopoly with differentiated products. First, we show that
for any finite number of firms, any symmetric equilibrium involves a positive level
of consumer stockpiling. Second, by introducing free entry, we show that the
excess entry theorem continues to hold under consumer stockpiling. Finally, we
show how consumer stockpiling can result in biased empirical estimates of demand
elasticities, and how this varies with the numbers of firm in the market.
The fourth essay introduces Behavioural-Based Price Discrimination (BBPD) into
a storable product market. It shows that, in equilibrium, consumer stockpiling
behaviour can be used as a device for the firm to perform BBPD. The results
show that consumer stockpiling improves consumer surplus and profit despite the
associated BBPD
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is broadly related to consumer stockpiling behaviour. It is often ob-
served that consumers buy more for future consumption. Evidence of this phe-
nomenon has been well documented for a host of retail products including cola,
sugar, coffee, pasta, and laundry detergent, among many others (See Blattberg,
Eppen and Lieberman, 1981; Neslin, Henderson and Quelch, 1985; Mela, Jedidi
and Bowman, 1998; Pesendorfer, 2002).
This in turn generates dynamic effects that bring forward consumers’ future de-
mand. Due to this nature, consumer stockpiling has received wide academic at-
tention. While some perspectives of it are well documented by practitioners and
scholars, some are largely unaddressed, with implications for many areas of eco-
nomic policy. In the spirit of this, this thesis aims to enhance our understanding
of some selected topics regarding consumer stockpiling.
The core of this thesis is a collection of four theoretical essays on the econom-
ics of consumer stockpiling. While Chapter 2 presents a short note on a general
framework, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 examine consumer stockpiling behavioural more
extensively and comprehensively. In particular, Chapters 2 and 3 provide implic-
ations for demand estimation. Chapter 4 focuses on market entry, before Chapter
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5 aims to explain how consumer stockpiling can be used to enable a special form
of Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination (BBPD).
I now present a more detailed summary of this thesis. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3
mainly focus on the biased empirical estimates of own- and cross-price elasticities
of demand that can result from consumer stockpiling. It has been well documented
that most standard demand estimations employ a static methodology and so fail
to disentangle consumers’ true underlying demand from the dynamic effects of
stockpiling. As a result, standard approaches produce biased estimates of own-
and cross-price elasticities (Erdem et al, 2003; Hendel and Nevo, 2006a, 2006b,
2013; Perrone, 2017). Such biases give rise to a number of significant implications,
including biased estimates of i) market power and the price effects of mergers, ii)
the welfare effects of new product introductions, iii) the effects of tax changes on
consumption, and iv) the profitability of sales promotions. Despite the obvious
importance of this issue, the existing theoretical literature has offered little help.
There are relatively few equilibrium models of consumer stockpiling, especially
in markets with differentiated products, as most relevant for empirical work. In
addition, such models have not been used to explicitly analyse the effects of stock-
piling on demand elasticities. As a result, empirical researchers and policymakers
have little guidance in knowing the potential nature of such biases, and when they
matter most. This thesis therefore wishes to take some initial steps to fill in the
gap. To this end, a general framework of biased elasticities is provided in Chapter
2, before a differentiated duopoly model is considered in Chapter 3.
Chapter 2 offers a general framework to consider such biases. Despite its simplicity,
such an approach appears to have been overlooked within the literature. In more
detail, this general framework supposes that a firm’s observable demand in a given
period is composed of two parts: i) a ‘true’ underlying demand that does not derive
from any changes in consumers’ inventories, and ii) an ‘inventory’ demand that
derives solely from changes in consumers’ inventories. If one measures the own-
price or cross-price elasticity based on observed demand, rather than true demand,
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we show that the resulting biases can be positive, negative, or zero depending upon
i) the difference between the elasticities of true demand and inventory demand,
and ii) whether net stockpiling is positive or negative.
Chapter 3 places more structure on the framework of Chapter 2 by developing
an example equilibrium model of stockpiling in an effort of further understanding
the biases. To provide a meaningful analysis of the own- and cross-price elasti-
city biases, such a model necessarily requires a differentiated products oligopoly.
Moreover, to fully understand the biases and how they may change with market
parameters, we also require an equilibrium model with endogenous prices.
Despite the challenges of this task, we present a simple tractable model of a two-
period differentiated products duopoly. We show that in any symmetric equilib-
rium, a (weak) subset of the consumers stockpile to avoid additional transaction
costs. We find that the equilibrium measures of both the own- and cross-price
elasticities biases are zero when product differentiation is low, but are strictly pos-
itive when product differentiation is high. To further consider when these biases
matter most, we show that they are strictly increasing in the degree of product
differentiation when net stockpiling is positive, but strictly decreasing in the de-
gree of product differentiation in period 2, when net stockpiling is negative. This
indicates to policymakers and econometricians when the exclusion of the dynamic
effects of consumer stockpiling matters most.
Chapter 4 considers consumer stockpiling in a wider oligopoly setting with free
entry. From the previous literature and Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, it is
now commonly understood that ignoring dynamic effects of consumer stockpiling
behaviour leads to biased empirical estimates of own- and cross-price elasticities,
with significant implications for competition policy, tax policy, marketing and
others. However, very little remains known about how the number of firms in a
market affect consumer stockpiling behaviour and the consequent elasticity biases.
By focusing on the role played by the number of firms in an oligopoly market, we
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aim to fill in this gap.
In particular, Chapter 4 considers consumer stockpiling behaviour, market entry,
and the implied elasticities biases within a spatial n-firm oligopoly setting. As
a primary contribution, this chapter firstly studies how the number of firms in
market determines consumer stockpiling behaviour and the biases of own- and
cross-price elasticities for a fixed level of market entry. The chapter then ana-
lyses how these conclusions change when free entry is allowed and the number of
firms becomes endogenous. As a second contribution, because consumer stock-
piling behaviour involves intra-period demand shifts that might potentially affect
firms’ entry decisions, this chapter studies the extent to which the excessive entry
theorem still applies under consumer stockpiling.
The results show that in any symmetric equilibrium, a (weak) subset of consumers
stockpiles to avoid additional transaction costs. Depending on the number of firms
in the market, the biases of price elasticity can either be zero or positive. By
treating the number of firms as endogenous, we show that excessive entry theorem
still holds when consumers stockpile, but restrictions on entry do not necessarily
increase social welfare. We finally consider how the biases of own- and cross-price
elasticities vary with respect to transaction cost and product differentiation under
free entry. Our findings suggest that the previous results of Chapter 2 are robust
to free entry. The associated elasticities biases are strictly increasing in the degree
of product differentiation when net stockpiling is positive, but strictly decreasing
in the degree of product differentiation in period 2.
Chapter 5 considers a different aspect of consumer stockpiling by showing how it
may enable a form of Behavioural-Based Price Discrimination (BBPD). Despite
the literature of BBPD having received a wide attention in recent years, an analysis
of such stockpiling-based price discrimination remains rare. Moreover, associated
welfare analysis remains ambiguous in the literature. Addressing these omissions
is important for the implications of consumer policy in relevant markets.
4
In more detail, we set up a two-period monopoly model with consumer stockpiling.
In equilibrium, higher match value consumers stockpile in advance while consumers
with lower match value do not. Hence, the firm can segment consumers according
to their match value and perform BBPD.
Generally, the literature on BBPD is often associated with the recent technolo-
gies that allow firms to acquire information about consumers’ previous purchase
history. Meanwhile, this can also be done via observing consumers’ actual stockpil-
ing behaviour. The intertemporal demand substitution allows sellers to recognise
those buyers that have not stockpiled and to price discriminate between consumers
based on their past stockpiling behaviour.
We then examine the welfare effects of such BBPD. We show that being able to
stockpile always increases aggregate consumer surplus and firm profits despite any
potential BBPD. For the firm, this BBPD prompts it to optimally select lower
prices in a way that increases its profits from the resulting increase in market
demand. For the consumers, their surplus increases due to i) being able to stockpile
and thereby reduce their expenditure on transaction costs, and ii) the reduced
prices. Hence, policymakers should not be concerned by such a form of price
discrimination.
Finally, it is important to note that while this thesis focuses on consumer stock-
piling behaviour, its results can often be reinterpreted to apply to other contexts
too, such as some forms of long-term contracts. These contracts allow consumers
to pay a fixed-price in advance for the services and products that they receive in
the future. Similar to consumer stockpiling, these contracts induce future demand
to be shifted forward. It then follows that the monopolist can identify its pre-
vious consumers. Common examples include energy markets, mortgage markets,
telecommunication markets, gym memberships, magazine subscriptions and bank
services.
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Chapter 2
Consumer Stockpiling and Demand
Elasticity Biases: A General
Framework
2.1 Introduction
Consumers often stockpile goods for future consumption. Evidence of this phe-
nomenon has been well documented for a host of retail products including cola,
sugar, coffee, pasta, and laundry detergent, among many others (See Blattberg,
Eppen and Lieberman, 1981; Neslin, Henderson and Quelch, 1985; Mela, Jedidi
and Bowman, 1998; Pesendorfer, 2002). However, most standard demand estim-
ations employ a static methodology and so fail to disentangle consumers’ true
underlying demand from the dynamic effects of stockpiling. As a consequence, it
is now commonly understood that standard approaches produce biased estimates
of own- and cross-price elasticities.1 Such biases give rise to a number of signific-
ant implications. For instance, such elasticities biases lead to i) underestimate of
1For instance, see Erdem et al (2003), Hendel and Nevo (2006a, 2006b, 2013), and Perrone
(2016).
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market power and the anti-competitive effects of mergers (e.g. Bresnahan, 1987;
Hendel and Nevo, 2006a), ii) overestimates of the responsiveness of consumption
following a tax change (e.g. Wang, 2015), and iii) exaggerations of the profitabil-
ity of sales promotions2. In order to provide a clearer theoretical guidance about
when these biases matter most, it is important to first know the characteristics.
To this end, before later examining the implied biases with full equilibrium mod-
els of duopoly and oligopoly (in Chapters 3 and 4), this chapter firstly provides a
general framework.
In more detail, our general framework supposes that a firm’s observable demand
in a given period is composed of two parts: i) a ‘true’ underlying demand that
does not derive from any changes in consumers’ inventories, and ii) an ‘stockpil-
ing’ demand that derives solely from changes in consumers’ inventories. If one
measures the own-price or cross-price elasticity based on observed demand, rather
than true demand, we show that the resulting biases can be positive, negative, or
zero depending upon i) the difference between the elasticities of true demand and
inventory demand, and ii) whether net stockpiling is positive or negative.
Despite its simplicity, such an approach appears to have been overlooked within
the literature. It shows that any failure to take into account the role of stockpiling
can lead to an over- or under-estimation of the true own- and cross-price demand
elasticities, or even to no bias at all, depending on some intuitive conditions.
This general framework provides a key foundation for Chapter 3 and 4 of this
thesis, in which we place more structure on this framework by developing example
equilibrium models of stockpiling within a differentiated products duopoly and
oligopoly.
Empirical studies of stockpiling have a long history in marketing. Such studies
typically seek to decompose estimated price elasticities into their different de-
mand sources, such as stockpiling and brand switching, e.g. Gupta (1988), Bell
2More details about i)-iii) are provided in the appendix for the purposes of this thesis.
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et al (1999), and the review by Gedenk et al (2010). An alternative empirical
approach involves the development and testing of stockpiling predictions using
reduced form analysis. Examples include Boizot et al (2001), Pesendorfer (2002),
and notably Hendel and Nevo (2006a) who also provide an insightful discussion
of the implications of stockpiling for demand elasticity estimation. The issue of
elasticity estimation under stockpiling has been expanded in some recent studies
that employ dynamic structural estimates (e.g. Erdem et al, 2003, Hendel and
Nevo 2006b, 2013, and Perrone, 2016). For instance, Hendel and Nevo (2006b)
use data on laundry detergent purchases to suggest that standard static methods
overestimate own-price elasticities by 30% and underestimate cross-price elasticit-
ies by around 80%, while Perrone (2017) offers a quicker estimation method to
suggest that own-price elasticities are overestimated by 20-100% using data on
French food. In contrast, this chapter provides a simple, yet general theoretical
framework to understand the factors involved in biased elasticity measurements.
2.2 A General Framework
This section provides a general theoretical foundation to study the biases that
may result when own- and cross-price elasticities are calculated while ignoring the
effects of consumer stockpiling.
Consider a market with n ≥ 1 single product firms, i ∈ {1, ..., n}.3 The product is
storable in the sense that a purchased unit can be consumed either immediately or
stockpiled for consumption in a later period; however it can only be consumed once.
Denote Q̂it ≥ 0 as firm i’s total ‘observed’ demand in period t. This is composed
of two parts, Q̂it = Qit + ∆it. The first part, Qit ≥ 0, is firm i’s ‘true’ underlying
demand that does not derive from any changes in consumers’ inventories. In
contrast, the second part, ∆it ≥ −Qit, represents firm i’s ‘stockpiling’ demand
3This can be easily extended to consider multi-product firms.
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which is defined as the net demand that derives solely from changes in consumers’
inventories. If stockpiling demand is positive, ∆it > 0, consumers in period t are
stockpiling - adding to their inventories by more than they are reducing them.
Here, the level of observed demand is larger than true demand, Q̂it > Qit. On
the other hand, if stockpiling demand is negative, ∆it ∈ [−Qit, 0), consumers, on
balance, are using their existing inventories to replace some or all of their true
demand, Qit. In this case, observed demand is less than true demand, Q̂it < Qit.
Now denote Qit(.) and ∆it(.) as the demand functions for firm i in period t that
relate to true demand and stockpiling demand, respectively. Beyond assuming that
these demand functions are continuously differentiable, we can remain agnostic
about how they are affected by changes in firm i’s own price, pit, or by changes in
the price of some other firm j 6= i, pjt. It then follows that the own- and cross-price
elasticities of ‘observed’ demand for firm i in period t equal
ρ̂iit(.) = −
∂ (Qit(.) + ∆it(.))
∂pit
· pit
Qit(.) + ∆it(.)
and ρ̂jit(.) =
∂ (Qit(.) + ∆it(.))
∂pjt
· pjt
Qit(.) + ∆it(.)
.
Similarly, the own- and cross-price elasticities of ‘true’ demand for firm i in period
t can be written respectively as
ρiit(.) = −
∂Qit(.)
∂pit
· pit
Qit(.)
and ρjit(.) =
∂Qit(.)
∂pjt
· pjt
Qit(.)
,
and the own- and cross-price elasticities of stockpiling demand for firm i in period
t are
ηiit(.) = −
∂∆it(.)
∂pit
· pit
∆it(.)
and ηjit(.) =
∂∆it(.)
∂pjt
· pjt
∆it(.)
.
Hence, the elasticities of observed demand may differ from the elasticities of true
demand. Moreover, using observed demand to estimate the true demand elasticit-
ies may lead to biased results unless one takes into account the effects of stockpiling
demand. The extent of any such bias can be measured by the difference between
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the observed and true elasticities, where the superscript h = {i, j} allows us to
refer to own-price or cross-price biases respectively:
θhit(.) = ρ̂
h
it(.)− ρhit(.) for h = {i, j}
After rewriting the expression for the (own- or cross-price) elasticity of observed
demand as a weighted average of the elasticities of true demand and stockpiling
demand,
ρ̂hit(.) = ρ
h
it(.) +
∆it(.)
Qit(.) + ∆it(.)
(
ηhit(.)− ρhit(.)
)
for h = {i, j}, (2.1)
one can immediately state the following:
Proposition 2.1. The bias between the observed and true (own- or cross-price)
elasticity in period t equals:
θhit(.) = ρ̂
h
it(.)− ρhit(.) =
∆it(.)
Qit(.) + ∆it(.)
(
ηhit(.)− ρhit(.)
)
for h = {i, j}. (2.2)
i) The bias is zero if stockpiling demand is zero, ∆it(.) = 0, or the elasticities of
stockpiling and true demand are equal, ηhit(.) = ρhit(.).
ii) When stockpiling demand is positive, ∆it(.) > 0, the bias is positive (or neg-
ative) if the stockpiling demand elasticity, ηhit(.), is greater (or less) than the true
demand elasticity, ρhit(.).
iii) When stockpiling demand is negative, ∆it(.) < 0, the bias is negative (or
positive) if the stockpiling demand elasticity, ηhit(.), is greater (or less) than the
true demand elasticity, ρhit(.).
Proposition 2.1 shows how both elasticity biases can, in principle, be negative,
positive, or zero depending upon some intuitive conditions. This has two implic-
ations. First, the previous literature suggests that the own-price elasticity bias is
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always positive by focusing exclusively on the case where stockpiling demand is
positive and where observed demand is more elastic than true demand. Propos-
ition 2.1 shows that this corresponds to situations where the stockpiling demand
elasticity is greater than the true demand elasticity, but stresses that is only one
of several possible cases. Second, the literature has recognised that the cross-price
elasticity bias may be either positive or negative, Hendel and Nevo (2006b, 2013).
After providing a full theoretical foundation, Proposition 2.1 demonstrates how
this ambiguity depends upon i) the relative magnitudes of the elasticities of stock-
piling demand and true demand, ηhit − ρhit, and ii) whether the current value of
consumers’ (net) stockpiling demand, ∆it(.), is positive or negative.
2.3 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have provided a theoretical analysis of the biases that can
result when measuring own- and cross-price elasticities when the role of consumer
stockpiling is ignored. We presented a general theoretical foundation to character-
ise the determinants of such biases. We showed that both the own- and cross-price
elasticity biases can be positive, negative, or zero depending upon i) the difference
between the elasticities of true demand and stockpiling demand, and ii) whether
net stockpiling is positive or negative.
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Appendix:
In this appendix, we provide some more detail to explain how ignoring the effects
of consumer stockpiling behaviour can affect the estimation of market power, the
impact of tax policy, and the profitability of firms’ sales promotions. As further
detailed in the main text of this chapter, denote Q̂it as firm’s i’s total ’observed’
demand in period t, and let this be composed of two parts, Qˆit = Qit + ∆it. The
first part, Qit, indicates firm’s true demand, that is independent from consumer
stockpiling. The second part ∆it represents firm i’s stockpiling demand. Figure
2.1 provides a simple demand and supply curve to help explain these.
Figure 2.1: An Illustration of the Biases of Own-Price Elasticity
Market Power
The Lerner Index is a measure market power. It is defined by m = p−mc
p
= 1
ρ
,
where p is the price that maximises monopolist’s profit, c is the marginal cost,
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and ρ is the price elasticity of demand. From Figure 2.1, it can be seen that the
curve of observed demand, Qˆit = Qit +∆it, is flatter and elastic than that of true
demand, Qit. Hence if only observed demand is considered, then the Lerner index
measured by observed demand is given by,
mˆ =
1
ρˆ
where ρˆ indicates price elasticity of observed demand, ρˆ = −∂(Qit+∆it)
∂pit
pit
Qit+∆it
.
Whereas the true (long-run) Lerner index, measured by true demand only is just
m =
1
ρ
where ρ indicates price elasticity of true demand, ρ = −∂Qit
∂pit
pit
Qit
.
Hence, the bias of Lerner Index (market power) when a policymaker uses observed
demand rather than true demand equals
mˆ−m = 1
ρˆ
− 1
ρ
which can be rewritten as,
mˆ−m = 1
ρˆ
− 1
ρ
=
ρˆ− ρ
ρˆρ
One can then find that the level of the bias of Lerner Index, mˆ − m, hinges on
the difference between the elasticity of true demand and that of observed demand.
The existing literature focusses on the case where ρˆ− ρ to suggest that the bias is
positive such that ignoring the effects of stockpiling underestimates market power.
However, in Section 2.2.1, we explain in detail that, depending on the ∆it, the
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difference between elasticity of true demand and that of observed can be positive,
negative, or zero upon some intuition conditions of stockpiling demand ∆it. This
clarifies the claims of the previous literature about the incorrect estimations of
market power that can result from ignoring consumer stockpiling behaviour.
Tax Policy and Sales Promotion Profitability
We now show how the failure to account for consumer stockpiling can bias the
estimated effects of tax policy and sales promotions. measurement of market
power. This can be most easily explained graphically.
In Figure 2.1, the flatter demand curve indicates the observed demand, whereas
the steeper curve indicates the true demand. Given this, if price increases by C,
due to a tax increase, it can be observed that the expected reduction in observed
demand is larger than the expected reduction in true demand. This coincides
the findings of Wang (2015) that suggests that ignoring the effects of consumer
stockpiling can lead to overestimates of the responsiveness of soda consumption
following an increase in soda tax in the U.S.
Similarly, now consider a potential sales promotion where a firm considers a price
cut. The increase in demand on the observed demand curve is larger than that
on the true demand. This is consistent with some marketing literature suggesting
that ignoring the effects of stockpiling can lead to an exaggerated estimates of the
profitability of sales promotions (See Gupta 1988, Gednek et al 2010). However,
the existing literature tends to solely focus on the intertemporal substitution of
demand and ignore the effect of the biases of elasticity. The detailed illustration
in Section 2.2.1 helps better understand to what extent exactly the profitability of
sales promotions are exaggerated from ignoring consumer stockpiling behaviour.
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Chapter 3
Equilibrium Consumer Stockpiling
and Demand Elasticity Biases
3.1 Introduction
In the introduction of Chapter 2, the necessities of studying consumer stockpiling
behaviour and the consequences of its failure have been summarised. Despite the
obvious importance of this issue, the existing theoretical literature has offered
little help. Indeed, as later detailed, there are relatively few equilibrium models of
consumer stockpiling, especially in markets with differentiated products, as most
relevant for empirical work. Moreover, such models have not been used to explicitly
analyse the effects of stockpiling on demand elasticities. As a result, empirical
researchers and policymakers have little guidance in knowing the potential nature
of such biases, and when they may matter most.
Chapter 2 has already provided a general framework for analysing relevant biases
of own- and cross-price elasticities. To illustrate some deeper results, this chapter
places more structure on the framework by developing an example equilibrium
model of stockpiling within a differentiated products duopoly. The results imply
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that static estimates of own- and cross-price elasticities can be unbiased if product
differentiation is low, even though net consumer stockpiling is positive. Otherwise,
static estimates are predicted to be positively biased, and either increasing or de-
creasing in the level of product differentiation depending on whether net consumer
stockpiling is positive or negative, respectively.
In more detail, to better understand the biases suggested by Chapter 2, we place
more structure on the framework by developing an example equilibrium model of
stockpiling. To provide a meaningful analysis of the own- and cross-price elasti-
city biases, such a model necessarily requires a differentiated products oligopoly.
Moreover, to fully understand the biases and how they may change with market
parameters, we also require an equilibrium model with endogenous prices. Despite
the challenges of this task, in this chapter we present a simple tractable model of
a two-period differentiated products duopoly. In each period, consumers wish to
consume exactly one unit, but may purchase a second unit in period 1 to store
for consumption in period 2. As consistent with many retail markets, consumers
incur positive transaction costs every time they make a purchase from a firm, but
independent of the number of units bought. Such transaction costs can arise from
the potential costs of visiting a firm, locating the product, ordering a delivery, or
simply remembering to make a purchase.1
The model shows that any symmetric equilibrium involves positive consumer
stockpiling. Intuitively, the transaction costs encourage consumers to stockpile
in order to avoid such costs in the future. We show that the total level of stock-
piling is increasing in the level of transaction cost, and decreasing in the level of
product differentiation.
1Some common examples include the cost of visiting a store, locating an item in the store
or delivering. Transaction cost helps explain why many consumers do their shopping weekly
rather than daily. Later, we relax this condition by assuming that transaction cost is incurred
only if the repeated trips to the store are made. For evidence of the importance of transaction
costs for consumer decisions more generally, see Marshall and Pires (2017). In addition, Seiler
(2013) provides evidence that transaction costs play large roles in explaining consumer’s purchase
decision on storable product market. The importance of transaction cost applies throughout the
thesis.
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By combining the insights of the general framework suggested by Chapter 2 with
the equilibrium model, we then characterise the implied elasticity biases. The
results depend on the extent of product differentiation. When product differ-
entiation is relatively high, both the own- and cross-price elasticities biases are
strictly positive. Furthermore, we find that the biases are increasing in the de-
gree of product differentiation, and decreasing in the level of transaction costs.
In contrast, if product differentiation is sufficiently low such that all consumers
stockpile, then both elasticity biases can actually be negligible. Thus, to guide
empirical researchers and policymakers, our results predict that elasticity biases
matter most in markets with higher levels of product differentiation.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature. To
place more structure, Section 3.3 introduces the set-up of the duopoly stockpiling
model, and Section 3.4 solves for equilibrium. The implications of the model for
the associated biases are then presented and discussed in Section 3.5. Finally,
Section 3.6 concludes. All proofs are listed in appendix.
3.2 Related Literature
This chapter aims to provide a better theoretical basis to analyse the effects of
stockpiling on demand estimation. The empirical literature on stockpiling has
already been reviewed in Chapter 2. For this chapter, we offer an equilibrium
model of stockpiling to assess how product differentiation affects such biases.
While some related models exist in the literature, they are surprisingly rare, and
they have not been used to provide a detailed analysis of elasticity biases. From
the existing models, some do not allow for endogenous prices and would therefore
being unable to fully assess the biases and their comparative statics in a market
equilibrium (e.g. the theoretical sections of Boizot et al, 2001; Hendel and Nevo
2006a, 2006b; Perrone, 2017). Others allow for endogenous prices, but assume that
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firms sell homogeneous products in a way that would limit any analysis of own-
or cross-price elasticities (e.g. Salop and Stiglitz, 1982; Sobel, 1984; Pesendorfer,
2002; Hong et al, 2002; Bell et al, 2002; Anton and Das Varma 2005; Hosken and
Reiffen, 2007).
This leaves only two papers, beyond our own, that consider stockpiling under
differentiated products and endogenous prices. The first is Guo and Villas-Boas
(2007), who present a two-period Hotelling model and show that consumers with
relatively strong brand preferences are more likely to stockpile in period 1. Hence,
as more consumers stockpile, price competition in period 2 becomes more intense
because only the consumers with relatively weak brand preferences remain. This
effect is sufficient to deter firms from lowering prices such that the equilibrium
involves no consumer stockpiling. In their extensions, they briefly show how stock-
piling can occur if i) consumers’ preferences can change over time, or ii) consumers
value the future sufficiently more than firms, but do not analyse the associated
elasticity biases. Our equilibrium model of stockpiling builds on their analysis
(albeit with a more flexible model of product differentiation) by demonstrating
how transaction costs can provide an especially tractable and realistic source of
positive stockpiling, before focusing on analysing the implications for elasticity
biases.
The second paper is Hendel and Nevo (2013), who also develop an equilibrium
model of stockpiling. However, rather than deriving any formal theoretical pre-
dictions about elasticity biases, they pursue a wider structural investigation into
intertemporal price discrimination. Their model assumes an exogenous partition of
consumers into storers and non-storers, and that firms commit to a price path over
time. In contrast, the partition between storers and non-storers in our equilibrium
model arises endogenously due to differences in consumers’ brand preferences. We
also allow for the more realistic scenario where firms have no price commitment.
Similar to them, due to the challenges of fully demonstrating the existence of
equilibria in dynamic models of stockpiling with differentiated products, we fo-
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cus on fully characterising the unique local symmetric equilibrium. Any (global)
symmetric equilibrium must necessarily have the properties of such a unique local
symmetric equilibrium. For related reasons, Hendel and Nevo (2013) assume the
concavity of their profit function. We return to further compare our results to the
existing literature in Section 3.5.3.
3.3 A Model of Endogenous Stockpiling
In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we present an equilibrium model of stockpiling. This model
is then combined with the results of the previous section to study the implications
for the elasticity biases in Section 3.5.
3.3.1 Assumptions
Consider a market where two firms, i = {A,B}, sell a single, horizontally dif-
ferentiated, storable good with zero production costs over two periods, t = 1, 2.
There is a unit mass of risk-neutral consumers with quasi-linear preferences who
each want to consume one unit of the good per period. To model brand prefer-
ences, we use Perloff and Salop’s (1985) random utility framework.2 In particular,
having bought product i in period t at price, pit, let consumer m’s net utility of
consuming one unit of product i equal uim(pit) = εim − pit, where consumer m’s
gross utility, εim, is a consumer-firm specific match value. Such match values are
independently distributed across firms and consumers with G(εim) = G(ε) ∀i,m,
and remain fixed throughout the game. For tractability, we assume that G(ε) is a
uniform distribution on [a, b] with a ≥ 0 and µ ≡ b− a > 0 such that G(ε) = ε−a
µ
2This framework is being used increasingly in a variety of applications, such as bundling
(Zhou, 2017) and consumer search (Armstrong, 2016). With suitable restrictions, it flexibly
encompasses the familiar Hotelling set-up as a special case. In our case, it is also useful in
highlighting the different effects of consumers’ preferences and consumers’ transaction costs. In
Chapter 4, we use Salop circular city framework, which is more related to Hotelling set-up, to
consider some different issues in an n-firm oligopoly.
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and G′(ε) = g(ε) = 1
µ
for ε ∈ [a, b]. The parameter, µ, can be interpreted as the
degree of product differentiation.
Importantly, we assume that transactions are costly for consumers. Specifically,
each time a consumer makes a purchase of one or more units from any given
firm, the consumer incurs a transaction cost, κ > 0, as consistent with the cost
of visiting the firm, locating the product, or ordering a delivery. As standard,
we let each consumer’s outside option be sufficiently unattractive such that they
always consume one unit of the market good each period - although they need
not buy each period due to the possibility of stockpiling. For simplicity, we also
suppose that all agents have a discount factor close to one, as most appropriate
for products that are purchased frequently (e.g. bottles of cola), and normalise
any physical costs of stockpiling to zero.34
The timing of the game is then as follows. In period 1, each firm i simultaneously
chooses its period 1 price, pi1. Consumers then learn their match values for each
firm and observe prices before making their purchase decisions. Each consumer
must decide whether to buy either one unit for consumption in period 1 only, or
an additional second unit to stockpile for consumption in period 2, and choose
which firm(s) to buy from. In period 2, each firm then simultaneously chooses
its period 2 price, pi2. Consumers observe these prices, and any remaining ‘active’
consumers that did not stockpile in period 1 then choose which firm to purchase
from. We consider (pure-strategy) symmetric equilibria where the firms set period
1 price, p∗1, and period 2 price, p∗2. In particular, as noted in Section 3.2, we focus
on characterising on the unique local symmetric equilibrium. Hence, we need only
consider local deviations around a potential symmetric equilibrium.
3The model becomes less tractable for lower levels of the discount factor. However, one
can show that an equilibrium with positive stockpiling will arise when the discount factor is
sufficiently large.
4One can easily extend the model to allow consumers to have positive stockpiling costs,
s ≥ 0, as consistent with the costs of storing a product. The results then hinge on the level of
net transaction costs, (κ− s), rather than κ.
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3.3.2 Benchmark Analysis
Let us briefly examine a benchmark where stockpiling is prohibited. In this case,
the two periods are identical. In any period t, a given consumer m will purchase
one unit from firm i rather than firm j if uim(pit) − κ ≥ ujm(pjt) − κ. Hence,
consumer m will prefer firm i if her relative brand preference for firm i, εim− εjm,
exceeds the associated price difference, pit−pjt. As such, consumer m will buy one
unit from firm i with probability Pr(εjm ≤ pit − pjt + εim) = G(pit − pjt + εim),
and firm i’s demand in period t equals
Qit(pit, pjt) =
∫ b
a
G(pit − pjt + ε)g(ε)dε = 1
2
+
pjt − pit
µ
(3.1)
After applying the usual first order condition for a symmetric equilibrium, p∗it =
−[Qit(p∗it, p∗it)/Q′it(p∗it, p∗it)], one obtains the standard equilibrium price and quant-
ity. In each period, each firm sets p∗ = µ
2
, sells to half of the consumers, Q∗ = 1
2
,
and earns (per-period) profits, pi∗ = µ
4
. Note that the equilibrium price and profits
are increasing in the degree of product differentiation, µ.
3.4 Equilibrium Analysis
We now consider the equilibrium of the full game by permitting stockpiling. To
begin, Section 3.4.1 analyses consumers’ decisions and demand, before Section
3.4.2 then endogenises firms’ behaviour.
3.4.1 Consumers’ Decisions and Demand
We first characterise some features of consumers’ stockpiling decisions and demand
in period 1 for a given set of period 1 prices {pA1, pB1}, and expected period
2 prices, {peA2, peB2}. Then we consider period 2 demand given period 2 prices,
{pA2, pB2}.
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3.4.1.1 Period 1
Consider consumer m’s options in period 1 given her match values {εAm, εBm}.
She could: i) stockpile by purchasing two units from some firm i = {A,B} to gain
USim = 2uim(pi1)− κ = 2(εim − pi1)− κ, (3.2)
ii) stockpile by purchasing one unit from each firm to gain
USm = uAm(pA1) + uBm(pB1)− 2κ = (εAm − pA1) + (εBm − pB1)− 2κ, (3.3)
or iii) not stockpile by purchasing one unit in each period to gain
UNSm = max{uAm(pA1), uBm(pB1)}+ max{uAm(peA2), uBm(peB2)} − 2κ. (3.4)
Then note the following. First, any stockpiling consumer m who stockpiles will al-
ways prefer to buy from a single firm under option i) rather than from two firms un-
der option ii), because this avoids making two costly transactions, max
{
USAm, U
S
Bm
}
>
USm ∀m. Hence, any consumer who buys their second unit from a firm in period 1
will also buy their first unit from the same firm. Second, consumerm will therefore
stockpile from i if this yields a greater utility than: a) stockpiling at j, such that
Ŝim = U
S
im − USjm = 2(εim − pi1)− 2(εjm − pj1) ≥ 0, (3.5)
and b) not stockpiling at all, such that
S˜im = U
S
im − UNSm ≥ 0. (3.6)
After defining ψm ≡ εAm−εBm ∈ [−µ, µ] as consumerm’s relative brand preference
for firm A, one can state the following. (Any proofs are listed in appendix.)
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Lemma 3.1. If consumer m finds it optimal to stockpile from firm A (or firm
B) in period 1, then so will any other consumer k with ψk ≡ εAk − εBk > ψm ≡
εAm − εBm (or ψk < ψm).
As in Guo and Villas-Boas (2007), this implies a positive relationship between
relative brand preferences and the propensity to stockpile from a given firm. Con-
sequently, we can derive the set of consumers that stockpile from A and B by
identifying two marginal consumers. In particular, by using Lemma 1, one can
define ψsA as the lowest value of ψm = εAm − εBm at which consumer m prefers
to stockpile from firm A, and ψsB as the highest value of ψm at which consumer
m prefers to stockpile from firm B. Consequently, as illustrated in Figure 3.1,
those consumers with ψm ∈ [ψsA, µ] constitute the set of consumers that stockpile
from A, XA(ψsA), and those consumers with ψm ∈ [−µ, ψsB] constitute the set of
consumers who stockpile from B, XB(ψsB). The values of ψsA and ψsB will later be
endogenised once we consider firms’ pricing decisions.
Figure 3.1: Consumers’ Stockpiling Decisions
We know that any consumer who buys two units in period 1 will do so from the
same firm. Hence, firm i’s set of stockpiling consumers, Xi(ψsi ), is always a weak
subset of the total number of consumers who purchase from firm i in period 1.
This leads to two possible cases. First, if ψsA = ψsB, then all consumers stockpile
in period 1, XA (ψsA) +XB (ψsB) = 1. Second, if ψsA > ψsB, then a positive measure
of consumers 1−XA(ψsA)−XB(ψsB) ∈ (0, 1] do not stockpile and only buy one
unit in period 1. By using the notation from Section 2.2, we can then state:
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Lemma 3.2. Firm i’s total ‘observed’ demand in period 1, Q̂i1(.), is:
Q̂i1(.) =

2Qi1(pi1, pj1) = 1 +
2
µ
(pj1 − pi1) if ψsA = ψsB
Qi1(pi1, pj1) +Xi (ψ
s
i ) =
1
2
+
pj1−pi1
µ
+Xi (ψ
s
i ) if ψsA > ψsB
(3.7)
If ψsA = ψsB, all consumers stockpile. Hence, firm i’s stockpiling demand is equal
to its true period 1 demand, Xi(.) = Qi1(.), and so firm i’s total period 1 de-
mand equals Q̂i1(.) = 2Qi1(.), where Qi1(pi1, pj1) coincides with the demand in
the benchmark, (3.1). If, instead, ψsA > ψsB, then only some consumers stockpile.
Here, firm i’s demand equals Q̂i1(.) = Qi1(pi1, pj1) + Xi (ψsi ) because a total of
Qi1(pi1, pj1) consumers buy from firm i, of which Qi1(pi1, pj1) − Xi (ψsi ) buy one
unit and Xi (ψsi ) buy two units.
3.4.1.2 Period 2
For period 2 demand, one can then state:
Lemma 3.3. Around any potential symmetric equilibrium, firm i’s total ‘observed’
demand in period 2, Q̂i2(.), is:
Q̂i2(.) =

0 if ψsA = ψsB
Qi2(pi2, pj2)−Xi (ψsi ) = 12 + pj2−pi2µ −Xi (ψsi ) > 0 if ψsA > ψsB
(3.8)
If ψsA = ψsB, all consumers have stockpiled and so period 2 is inactive. However,
if ψsA > ψsB, then consumers with ψm ∈ (ψSB, ψSA) did not stockpile and so remain
active. As in the benchmark, any such consumer will then buy one unit from
firm i rather than j if uim(pi2) − κ ≥ ujm(pj2) − κ. It then follows that firm i′s
total period 2 demand equals Qi2(pi2, pj2), from (3.1), minus those consumers that
stockpiled from firm i in period 1, Xi (ψsi ), from (3.8).
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3.4.2 Firms’ Decisions
Given consumer demand, we now analyse the firms’ equilibrium decisions. First,
we derive period 2 equilibrium prices for given levels of stockpiling. Second, we
derive the equilibrium levels of stockpiling demand for given period 1 prices and
expected period 2 prices, Xi(pi1, pj1, pei2, pej2), where consumers’ expectations of
period 2 prices are consistent with equilibrium, pei2 = p∗i2 (Xi, Xj). Third, given
the equilibrium levels of stockpiling demand, we then solve for period 1 equilibrium
prices.
3.4.2.1 Period 2
Period 2 is active only if ψsA > ψsB such that XA (ψsA) + XB (ψsB) < 1. If so, we
can state:
Lemma 3.4. Suppose ψsA > ψsB. Then, provided 3 − 4Xi (ψsi ) − 2Xj
(
ψsj
)
> 0
∀i, j 6= i ∈ {A,B}, the unique period 2 equilibrium has
p∗i2
(
Xi (ψ
s
i ) , Xj
(
ψsj
))
=
µ
6
[
3− 4Xi (ψsi )− 2Xj
(
ψsj
)]
> 0 (3.9)
and Q̂∗i2(.) = Qi2(p∗i2, p∗j2)−Xi (ψsi ) = 16
[
3− 4Xi (ψsi )− 2Xj
(
ψsj
)]
> 0.
To characterise the properties of a potential symmetric equilibrium, we need only
consider local deviations. Hence, provided that the firms’ period 1 prices are
sufficiently close such that their levels of stockpiling are not too dis-similar, with
3 − 4XA (ψsA) − 2XB (ψsB) > 0 and 3 − 4XB (ψsB) − 2XA (ψsA) > 0, Lemma 3.3
confirms that both firms will have positive period 2 equilibrium prices and demand.
Moreover, as in Guo and Villas-Boas (2007), it suggests that i) period 2 prices are
weakly lower than in the benchmark due to the potential absence of the stockpiling
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consumers who have relatively high brand preferences, and ii) the firm with the
largest level of stockpiling sets a lower period 2 price because it has proportionately
less consumers with a higher brand preferences.
3.4.2.2 Period 1
We now derive the equilibrium levels of stockpiling demand for given period 1
prices and expected period 2 prices. Following this, we solve for the equilibrium
prices in period 1.
Equilibrium Stockpiling Demand
Denote Xi(pi1, pj1, pei2, pej2) as firm i’s equilibrium level of stockpiling demand,
where consumers expectations are correct if pei2 = p∗i2 (Xi, Xj), for i, j 6= i ∈
{A,B}.
Proposition 3.1. Around any symmetric equilibrium, the unique levels of stock-
piling demand, X = {Xi(.), Xj(.)}, equal:
X =

{0, 0} if pi1 > µ2 + κ, pj1 > µ2 + κ{
1
2
−
(
2pi1−pj1−κ
µ
)
, 1
2
−
(
2pj1−pi1−κ
µ
)}
if pi1 ∈
(
κ+pj1
2
,
µ
2
+κ+pj1
2
]
, pj1 ∈
(
κ+pi1
2
,
µ
2
+κ+pi1
2
]
{
1
2
, 1
2
}
if pi1 ≤ κ, pj1 ≤ κ
(3.10)
When making their decision of whether or not to stockpile, the proof verifies that
an indifferent consumer at ψsi optimally compares i) the cost of stockpiling in
period 1 by buying a second unit from firm i, pi1, versus ii) the cost of returning
to buy a second unit in period 2 from firm i, rather than j, p∗i2 (Xi, Xj) + κ.
Hence, if both firms’ period 1 prices are sufficiently high, then no consumer finds
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it optimal to stockpile as pi1 > p∗i2 (0, 0)+κ for i = {A,B}. Similarly, if both firms’
period 1 prices are sufficiently low, then all consumers find it optimal to stockpile
as pi1 ≤ p∗i2
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
+ κ for i = {A,B}. This leaves the remaining case where both
firms’ period 1 prices are relatively moderate. Here, as in the middle line of (3.10),
there exists a unique level of equilibrium stockpiling, such that pi1 = p∗i2 (Xi, Xj)+κ
for each firm. If firm i’s period 1 price was below (above) this level for given levels
of Xi and Xj, more (fewer) consumers would find it optimal to stockpile at the
firm, which in turn would lower (raise) the firm’s period 2 equilibrium price until
this condition is satisfied.
Equilibrium Prices
We now complete the equilibrium by characterising period 1 prices. Firm i’s
associated profit function can be expressed as follows
pii(.) = pi1[Qi1(pi1, pj1) +Xi(.)] + p
∗
i2[Qi2(p
∗
i2, p
∗
j2)−Xi(.)] (3.11)
where firm i receives period 1 demand Q̂i1 = Qi1(pi1, pj1) + Xi(.) from (3.7) and
(3.10), and (if active) sets a period 2 equilibrium price p∗i2(.), (3.9), and receives a
period 2 equilibrium demand Q̂∗i2 = Qi2(p∗i2, p∗j2)−Xi(.) from (3.8). To begin, we
can then note the following important result.
Proposition 3.2. In any symmetric equilibrium with κ > 0, each firm receives a
positive level of stockpiling demand.
Proposition 3 contrasts with Guo and Villas-Boas’s (2007) no-stockpiling result
under zero transaction costs. Intuitively, if there is no stockpiling, we know from
the benchmark that prices are equal across periods, p∗1 = p∗2 =
µ
2
. However, when
transaction costs are positive, these prices imply p∗1 < p∗2 + κ such that consumers
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would optimally wish to stockpile to avoid incurring a second period transaction
cost. Instead, any symmetric equilibrium with κ > 0 must therefore involve a
positive level of stockpiling Xi = Xj = X∗ > 0:
Proposition 3.3. In any symmetric equilibrium:
i) when product differentiation is low, µ ≤ 3κ, the unique level of stockpiling
demand is X∗ = 1
2
, where p∗1 = min{µ2 , κ}, Q̂∗1 = 12 +X∗ = 1 and Q̂∗2 = 0.
ii) when product differentiation is high, µ > 3κ, the unique level of stockpiling
demand is X∗ = 3κ
2µ
∈ (0, 1
2
)
, where p∗1 =
µ−κ
2
, p∗2 =
µ−3κ
2
, Q̂∗1 =
1
2
+ X∗ < 1 and
Q̂∗2 =
1
2
−X∗ > 0.
When product differentiation is low, µ ∈ (0, 3κ], competition is strong and prices
are low relative to transactions costs, such that p∗1 ≤ κ holds in equilibrium.
From Proposition 3.1, this implies that all consumers optimally stockpile, X∗ = 1
2
.
When product differentiation is high, µ > 3κ, competition is weaker and prices are
higher relative to transactions costs, such that p∗1 > κ. As such, Proposition 3.1
implies that p∗1 = p∗2 + κ must hold in equilibrium and that this price relationship
uniquely determines the equilibrium level of stockpiling demand, X∗ ∈ (0, 1
2
)
. To
explore the determinants of stockpiling in more detail, we can now state:
Corollary 3.1. In any symmetric equilibrium, the level of stockpiling, X∗, is
(weakly) decreasing in the level of product differentiation, µ, and (weakly) increas-
ing in the size of the transaction cost, κ.
When product differentiation is low, µ ∈ (0, 3κ], all consumers stockpile and so
the equilibrium level of stockpiling, X∗ = 1
2
, is insensitive to small changes in
product differentiation or transaction costs. However, this changes when product
differentiation is high, µ > 3κ, such that some consumers stockpile, X∗ ∈ (0, 1
2
)
.
28
To understand the intuition, first consider a marginal change in product differ-
entiation, µ. Holding constant the level of stockpiling, X∗, both period prices
strictly increase, but period 1 prices increase by more, such that p∗1 > p∗2 + κ. As
a result, consumers are less inclined to stockpile, and X∗ reduces until the point
where p∗1 = p∗2 +κ is restored. Now, consider a marginal change in the transaction
cost, κ. Again, holding constant the level of stockpiling, X∗, the period 1 prices
p∗1 strictly decrease, while p∗2 + κ strictly increase, such that p∗1 < p∗2 + κ. As a
result, consumers are more inclined to stockpile, and X∗ increases until the point
where p∗1 = p∗2 + κ is restored.
3.5 Demand Elasticity Biases
Having completed our theoretical model of equilibrium stockpiling, we now com-
bine its insights with the results from Section 2.2 to study the implied demand
elasticity biases. Within the equilibrium model, period 1 net inventory demand is
positive and equivalent to the equilibrium level of stockpiling, ∆i1(.) = Xi(.) > 0.
Hence, from Proposition 2.1, the elasticity bias in period 1 equals
θhi1(.) = ρ̂
h
i1(.)− ρhi1(.) =
Xi(.)
Qi1(.) +Xi(.)
(
ηhi1(.)− ρhi1(.)
)
for h = {i, j}. (3.12)
In contrast, period 2 net inventory demand is negative and equivalent to the
equilibrium amount stockpiled in period 1, ∆i2(.) = −Xi(.) < 0, such that the
elasticity bias in period 2 is
θhi2(.) = ρ̂
h
i2(.)− ρhi2(.) =
−Xi(.)
Qi1(.)−Xi(.)
(
ηhi2(.)− ρhi2(.)
)
for h = {i, j}. (3.13)
In what follows, Section 3.5.1 evaluates the sign of each bias at the period’s equi-
librium price, p∗t , before Section 3.5.2 analyses the associated comparative statics
to understand when such biases matter most. Section 3.5.3 then discusses the
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results in the context of the previous literature. Henceforth, to ease exposition,
we focus on firm A without loss of generality.
3.5.1 Signs of the Biases
First, consider the case of low product differentiation, µ ∈ (0, 3κ], where all con-
sumers stockpile in period 1, X∗ = 0.5, such that any period 2 analysis is redund-
ant.
Proposition 3.4. When product differentiation is low, µ ∈ (0, 3κ], the own- and
cross-price elasticities of observed demand in period 1, ρ̂AA1(p∗1) and ρ̂BA1(p∗1), are
unbiased, such that θAA1(p∗1) = θBA1(p∗1) = 0.
This implies that demand elasticity estimates based only on observed demand
need not be biased when there is positive stockpiling. For instance, when product
differentiation is low, each consumer consumes one unit and stockpiles another,
such that the level and slope of observed demand are doubled. Consequently, the
own- and cross-price elasticities of observed demand remain equal to those for true
demand, ρ̂hA1(.) = −∂(2QA1(.))∂pA1 ·
pA1
2QA1(.)
= −∂QA1(.)
∂pA1
· pA1
QA1(.)
= ρhA1(.). An alternative
intuition can be understood using (3.12). Here, given all consumers stockpile,
the stockpiling demand equals the true demand, XA(.) = QA1(.), such that the
associated own- and cross-price elasticities are the same, ηhi1(.) = ρhi1(.).
Now, consider the case of high product differentiation, µ > 3κ, where some con-
sumers remain active in period 2 with X∗ < 0.5 :
Proposition 3.5. When product differentiation is high, µ > 3κ:
i) the own- and cross-price elasticities of observed demand in period 1, ρ̂AA1(p∗1)
and ρ̂BA1(p∗1), are positively biased, such that θAA1(p∗1) =
3(µ−κ)
µ+3κ
−
(
µ−κ
µ
)
> 0 and
θBA1(p
∗
1) =
2(µ−κ)
µ+3κ
−
(
µ−κ
µ
)
> 0;
30
ii) the own- and cross-price elasticities of observed demand in period 2, ρ̂AA2(p∗2)
and ρ̂BA2(p∗2), are positively biased, such that θAA2(p∗2) = θBA2(p∗2) = 1−
(
µ−3κ
µ
)
> 0.
To gain an initial understanding of the intuition, consider the own-price elasticity
biases for period 1 and 2 illustrated in Figure 3.2(a) and (b), respectively. Figure
3.2(a) shows that, in period 1, positive stockpiling demand ensures that i) the
slope of the observed demand curve is flatter than the true demand curve, ∂Q̂A1(.)
∂pA1
<
∂QA1(.)
∂pA1
< 0, and that ii) the observed quantity demanded is greater than the true
quantity demanded, Q̂i1 > Qi1. Both of these effects lead to an upward bias in
the own-price elasticity of observed demand, θAA1(p∗1) = ρ̂AA1(p∗1)− ρAA1(p∗1) > 0. In
contrast, Figure 3.2(b) shows that the observed demand in period 2 is parallel
and to the left of the true demand, due to the fact that the equilibrium level of
stockpiling is negative and independent of period 2 equilibrium prices. Intuitively,
any price change in period 2 after consumers have stockpiled cannot affect the
level of stockpiling demand in period 1. Therefore, the quantity demanded at a
given price is lower for observed demand than the true demand, so the own-price
elasticity of observed demand is greater than that of the true demand, θAA2(p∗2) =
ρ̂AA2(p
∗
2)− ρAA1(p∗2) > 0.
Figure 3.2: Own-Price Demand Elasticity Biases
Now consider the explanation of each bias in terms of Proposition 2.1, starting
with the period 1 own-price elasticity bias, θAA1(p∗1), in (3.12) with i = h = A. It
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follows that this bias is positive, θAA1(p∗1) > 0, because the stockpiling demand is
more elastic than the true demand, ηAA1(p∗1) > ρAA1(p∗1). This is for two reasons: i)
the slope of the stockpiling demand curve is flatter than the true demand curve,
∂XA(.)
∂pA1
< ∂QA1(.)
∂pA1
< 0, and ii) the quantity demanded at p∗1 is smaller for the
stockpiling demand than the true demand, X∗ < Q∗1. A similar reason applies for
why the period 1 cross-price elasticity of true demand is positively bias, θBA1(p∗1) >
0. However, in this case, only the latter equivalent effect is present, because the
marginal cross-price effects of the stockpiling demand and true demand are the
same, ∂XA(.)
∂pB1
= ∂QA1(.)
∂pB1
. Finally, consider the period 2 own- and cross-price elasticity
biases in (3.13), which are positive, and happen to be equal in our model. Note that
the own- and cross-price elasticities of inventory demand are zero, ηhA2(p∗2) = 0 for
h ∈ {A,B}, as the equilibrium level of inventory demand in period 2 is unrelated
to period 2 prices, ∂X∗
∂ph2
= 0. Then, from (3.13), the period 2 own- and cross-price
elasticity biases are positive, θhA2(p∗2) > 0 for h ∈ {A,B}, because the own- and
cross-price elasticities of true demand are positive, ρkA1(p∗1) > 0, and only a subset
of consumers stockpile, X∗ ∈ (0, Q∗1).
3.5.2 Comparative Statics
To understand when these biases matter most, we next consider how the biases
vary with the level of product differentiation or transaction costs.
Proposition 3.6. When product differentiation is high, µ > 3κ:
i) the period 1 own- and cross-price elasticity biases, θAA1(p∗1) and θBA1(p∗1), are
strictly increasing in the level of product differentiation, µ, and strictly decreasing
in the level of transaction costs, κ;
ii) the period 2 own- and cross-price elasticity biases, θAA2(p∗2) and θBA2(p∗2), are
strictly decreasing in the level of product differentiation, µ, and strictly increasing
in the level of transaction costs, κ.
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Proposition 3.6 implies that a change in product differentiation or transaction costs
have opposite effects on the elasticity biases depending on whether consumers are
adding to their inventories (i.e. period 1) or consuming from their inventories (i.e.
period 2).
To understand the underlying effects, first compare the impact of a increase in
product differentiation, µ, on the period 1 and period 2 own-price elasticity biases,
θAA1(p
∗
1) and θAA2(p∗2), expressed in (3.12) and (3.13) with i = h = A, respectively. In
period 1, this bias gets larger as µ increases, because the difference between ηAA1(p∗1)
and ρAA1(p∗1) becomes greater. The reason is that ηAA1(p∗1) increases at a faster rate
than ρAA1(p∗1).5 This effect is large enough to dominate a second offsetting effect
that lowers the ratio X∗
Q∗1+X∗
, through a reduction in X∗. In contrast, the period 2
own-price elasticity bias reduces as µ increases, despite the fact that ηAA2(p∗2) = 0
and that ρAA2(p∗2) strictly increases. The reason is that, in this case, the dominating
force is a second offsetting effect that reduces the ratio X∗
Q∗1−X∗ .
Now consider an increase in transaction costs, κ. Here, the effects on the period
1 and 2 own-price elasticity biases, θAA1(p∗1) and θAA2(p∗2), are similar to that ob-
served for a change in product differentiation. However, an increase in κ, has the
opposite effects on the equivalent two forces just discussed for µ, but the same
effect dominates in each case. For example, in period 1, the difference between
ηAA1(p
∗
1) and ρAA1(p∗1) becomes smaller, because ηAA1(p∗1) decreases at a faster rate
than ρAA1(p∗1). This effect dominates the second offsetting effect that raises the ra-
tio X∗
Q∗1+X∗
, through an increase in X∗. Finally, comparable arguments also apply
for the effects of µ and κ on the period 1 and 2 cross-price elasticity biases, θBA1(p∗1)
and θBA2(p∗2).
5At first glance, it may seem strange that an increase in product differentiation makes both
ηAAt(p
∗
1) and ρAAt(p
∗
1) more elastic. Commonly, an increase in product differentiation makes de-
mand less elastic. However, here we are evaluating the elasticities at the equilibrium price, p∗1,
which also increases with µ. Consequently, there is a direct and indirect effect on these elasticit-
ies. The direct effect reduces ηAA1(p
∗
1) and ρAA1(p
∗
1) by making them less elastic, but the indirect
effect raises them. In both cases, the indirect effects dominate such that ρAA1(p
∗
1) and ηAA1(p
∗
1)
increase with µ.
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3.5.3 Discussion and Relation to the Literature
The results of this section can be brought together in Figure 3.3, which illustrates
the relationships between each bias and the degree of product differentiation, µ.
It shows that there is no period 1 own- or cross-price elasticity bias when µ < 3κ,
and that the biases are positive and upward sloping thereafter. While the period
1 cross-price elasticity bias, θBA1(p∗1), is continuous with a kink at µ = 3κ, period 1
own-price elasticity bias, θAA1(p∗1), is discontinuous at 3κ, jumping from 0 to
1
3
. In
contrast, the period 2 own- and cross-price elasticity biases are only relevant when
µ > 3κ in which case they are positively signed. They are strictly decreasing in µ
over this range and tend to 1 as µ→ 3κ.
Figure 3.3: The Relationships between the Elasticity Biases and Product Differ-
entiation
We now discuss the predicted signs of the biases in relation to the existing literat-
ure. By concentrating on situations where observed demand is more elastic than
true demand, the previous literature has stressed that the own-price elasticity bias
is always positive (e.g. Hendel and Nevo, 2006a, 2006b, 2013; Perrone, 2017). In
contrast, the existing literature has recognised that the cross-price elasticity bias
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can be positive or negative, but has focussed on cases where it is negative (e.g.
Hendel and Nevo, 2006b, 2013). For instance, Hendel and Nevo (2013) provide
an intuition where a firm has undercut its rival and stimulated stockpiling in a
previous period. Then if the firm raises its price, the true cross-price effect will
be underestimated because consumers will be consuming from their inventories
rather than switching to the rival.
Contrary to this literature, our general theoretical foundation has shown that the
biases can be positive, negative, or zero depending upon some intuitive condi-
tions. Moreover, within the example equilibrium model of this Section, our results
demonstrate how both elasticity biases can be zero when product differentiation is
sufficiently low, despite positive consumer stockpiling. For higher levels of product
differentiation, we find that the own-price elasticity bias is positive as consistent
with the existing literature, but suggest that the cross-price elasticity bias is also
positive. This difference arises because of the following. In our model, the observed
and true cross-price effects in period 2 are the same because period 1 stockpiling
demand is insensitive to actual period 2 prices, such that ∂Qˆi2
∂pj2
= ∂Qi2
∂pj2
− ∂Xi
∂pj2
= ∂Qi2
∂pj2
.
Thus, the elasticity bias is driven solely by the fact that the level of observed de-
mand is less than the level of true demand, prompting it to be positive rather than
negative, ρˆi2 = ∂Qi2∂pj2
pj2
Qˆi2
> ρi2 ∀Qˆi2 < Qi2.
Finally, we discuss when our predicted biases matter most. Figure 3.3 illustrates
that the period 1 own- and cross-price elasticity biases are greater (less) than their
period 2 counterparts when product differentiation is high (low). This implies
that the own- and cross-price elasticity biases in period 1 (i.e. when consumers
are added to their inventories) are of least concern in markets where product
differentiation is low, but the elasticity biases in period 2 (i.e. when consumers
are reducing their inventories) are of least concern when product differentiation
is high. In addition, notice that an increase in transaction costs, κ, extends the
range where there is no elasticity biases in period 1, but when the elasticity biases
are positive, it shifts the period 1 elasticity biases down and the period 2 elasticity
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biases up. This implies that the period 1 own- and cross-price elasticity biases are
of less concern in markets with high transaction costs, but the period 2 elasticity
biases are of more concern.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we developed a full model of stockpiling in a differentiated products
duopoly with endogenous prices over two periods. In any symmetric equilibrium,
a (weak) subset of the consumers stockpile to avoid additional transaction costs.
We found that the equilibrium measures of both the own- and cross elasticity
biases are zero when product differentiation is low, but are strictly positive when
product differentiation is high. To further consider when the biases matter most,
we showed that they are strictly increasing in the degree of product differentiation
when net stockpiling is positive, but strictly decreasing in the degree of product
differentiation in period 2, when net stockpiling is negative.
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Appendix:
Proof of Lemma 3.1. From (3.5) and (3.6), consumer m will stockpile if a)
Ŝim = U
S
im − USjm ≥ 0 and b) S˜im = USim − UNSm ≥ 0. Suppose condition a) holds,
with USim ≥ USjm which implies (εim − pi1)− (εjm − pj1) ≥ 0. It then follows from
(3.4) that UNSm = uim(pi1) + max{uAm(peA2), uBm(peB2)} − 2κ, such that condition
b) can be rewritten as S˜im = (εim − pi1) − max{εim − pei2, εjm − pej2} + κ ≥ 0.
Therefore, Ŝim (or S˜im) is then strictly (or weakly) increasing in consumer m’s
relative brand preference for firm i, (εim − εjm) ∈ [−µ, µ].
Proof of Lemma 3.2. If ψsA = ψsB, all consumers stockpile. Here, using (3.3),
any given consumer will buy two units from i rather than j in period 1 if 2 (εi − pi1)−
κ ≥ 2 (εj − pj1) − κ. This comparison reduces down to that in the benchmark,
εi − pi1 > εj − pj1. Hence, firm i’s total period 1 demand equals Q̂i1(.) = 2Qi1(.),
where Qi1(pi1, pj1) coincides with the benchmark demand, (3.1).
If, instead, ψsA > ψsB, some consumers only buy one unit in period 1. As in
the benchmark, such consumers will buy one unit from firm i rather than j if
uim(pi1)− κ ≥ ujm(pj1)− κ and one can define ψ1 as the value of ψm = pA1 − pB1
at which such a consumer would be indifferent. Hence, a total of Qi1(pi1, pj1)
consumers buy from firm i, of which Qi1(pi1, pj1) − Xi (ψsi ) consumers buy one
unit and Xi (ψsi ) consumers buy two units, such that total demand equals Q̂i1(.) =
Qi1(pi1, pj1) +Xi (ψ
s
i ).
Proof of Lemma 3.3. If ψsA = ψsB, all consumers stockpile and so Q̂i2(.) = 0. If
instead, ψsA > ψsB, then consumers with ψm ∈ (ψSB, ψSA) did not stockpile and so
remain active. As in the benchmark, any such consumer will then buy one unit
from firm i rather than j if uim(pi2) − κ ≥ ujm(pj2) − κ, and one can define ψ2
as the value of ψm = pA2 − pB2 at which such a consumer would be indifferent.
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Around any symmetric equilibrium, ψ2 ∈ (ψsB, ψsA). Hence, there is a positive
measure of consumers with ψm ∈ (ψSB, ψ2) that strictly prefer to buy from firm
B and a positive measure of consumers with ψm ∈ (ψ2, ψSA, ) that strictly prefer
to buy from firm A. This implies that firm i′s total period 2 demand is equal
to the benchmark demand, Qi2(pi2, pj2) from (3.1), minus those consumers that
stockpiled from firm i in period 1, Xi (ψsi ) from (3.8).
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Suppose ψsA > ψsB. Then in any symmetric equilibrium,
it must be the case that ψ2 ∈ (ψsB, ψsA) such that both firms have positive demand.
Then one can use pii2(.) = pi2Q̂i2(.) with (3.8) to derive the firms’ period 2 best
responses for given stockpiling levels, p∗i2(pj2) =
pj2
2
+ µ
2
(
1
2
−Xi(ψsi )
)
for i j 6=
i ∈ {A,B}. Solving simultaneously yields the unique period 2 equilibrium prices,
p∗i2 =
µ
6
[
3 − 4Xi (ψsi ) − 2Xj
(
ψsj
)]
, and substituting these back into (3.8) gives
Q̂∗i2(.) =
1
6
[
3− 4Xi (ψsi )− 2Xj
(
ψsj
)]
. All such prices and demands are positive if
4Xi (ψ
s
i ) + 2Xj
(
ψsj
)
< 3 for all i, j 6= i ∈ A,B, which ensures ψ2 ∈ (ψsB, ψsA) as
claimed.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Having derived period 2 equilibrium prices, we first
consider consumers’ stockpiling decisions, before deriving the equilibrium levels of
stockpiling demand as a function of period 1 prices in (3.10).
First, consider consumers’ stockpiling decisions and initially suppose that each firm
has positive period 2 demand with ψ2 ∈ (ψsB, ψsA). This implies that a consumer
at ψsi makes her stockpiling decision by comparing i) the net marginal benefits
of stockpiling from firm i, with ii) the net marginal benefits of waiting to buy
from firm i, rather than firm j, in period 2. From (3.6), this implies S˜im(ψsi ) =
(εim− pi1)− (εim − p∗i2 (.)) + κ. By construction, the consumer at ψsi is indifferent
between stockpiling, such that S˜im(ψsi ) = 0. Hence, this indifference requires
pi1 = p
∗
i2 (Xi, Xj) + κ.
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We are now in a position to derive the equilibrium levels of stockpiling demand
as a function of period 1 prices. First, consider the top line of (3.10). Here,
pA1 > p
∗
A2 (0, 0)+κ and pB1 > p∗B2 (0, 0)+κ such that no consumer finds it optimal
to stockpile, XA = XB = 0. From (3.9), p∗i2(0, 0) =
µ
2
for both i = {A,B}, and so
this case occurs when pA1 > µ2 + κ and pB1 >
µ
2
+ κ.
Second, consider the bottom line of (3.10). Here, pA1 ≤ p∗A2
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
+ κ and pB1 ≤
p∗B2
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
+ κ such that all consumers find it optimal to stockpile, XA = XB = 12 .
Period 2 prices are unspecified as period 2 is inactive. However, if the marginal
consumer at ψsA = ψsB = 0 were to deviate from stockpiling, we know from (3.9)
that she should rationally expect zero period 2 prices, limXi→0.5p∗i2
(
Xi,
1
2
)
= 0.
Hence, this case occurs when pA1 ≤ κ and pB1 ≤ κ.
Third, consider the middle line of (3.10). Here, there exists a unique level of equi-
librium stockpiling, Xi(.) ∈ (0, 12) and Xj(.) ∈ (0, 12), such that pi1 = p∗i2 (Xi, Xj)+
κ holds for each firm. To find such Xi(.) and Xj(.), one can insert p∗i2 from (3.9)
to obtain
Xi(.) =
3
4
− Xj(.)
2
− 3(pi1 − κ)
2µ
. (3.14)
After deriving a similar equation for Xj(.) and solving simultaneously, one finds a
unique level of Xi(.) = 12 −
(
2pi1−pj1−κ
µ
)
for i j 6= i ∈ {A,B}. For Xi ∈ (0, 12), we
require pi1 ∈
(
κ+pj1
2
,
µ
2
+κ+pj1
2
]
for each firm.
Finally, note that the levels of stockpiling and associated conditions in (3.10) are
continuous as i) 1
2
−
(
2pi1−pj1−κ
µ
)
= 1
2
when pi1 = pj1 = κ, ii) 12 −
(
2pi1−pj1−κ
µ
)
= 0
when pi1 = pj1 = µ2 +κ, iii)
κ+pj1
2
= κ when pi1 = κ, and iv) 12
[
µ
2
+κ+pi1
]
= µ
2
+κ
when pi1 = µ2 + κ.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. From (3.10), XA = XB = 0 necessarily requires
pA1 >
µ
2
+ κ and pB1 > µ2 + κ. However, we know from the benchmark ana-
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lysis in Section 3.3.2 that XA = XB = 0 is consistent with p∗1 =
µ
2
. This then leads
to a contradiction as p∗1 =
µ
2
< µ
2
+ κ for all κ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. First suppose that period 2 is active with ψsA > ψsB
such that XA(.) +XB(.) < 1. In any symmetric equilibrium each firm has positive
period 2 demand with ψ2 ∈ (ψsB, ψsA). Using (3.8) and (3.9), firm i’s profit function
from (3.11) can then be rewritten as:
pii(.) = pi1[Qi1(pi1, pj1) +Xi(.)] + µ
(
3− 4Xi(.)− 2Xj(.)
6
)2
(3.15)
where Qi1 = 12 +
pj1−pi1
µ
from (3.7), and where Xi(.) and Xj(.) are given in (3.10).
To maximise (3.15) with respect to pi1 note that ∂pii1∂pi1 equals
Qi1(.)+Xi(.)+pi1
(
∂Qi1(.)
∂pi1
+
∂Xi(.)
∂pi1
)
+
µ
3
(3− 4Xi(.)− 2Xj(.))
(
−2
3
∂Xi(.)
∂pi1
− 1
3
∂Xj(.)
∂pi1
)
,
where ∂Qi1(.)
∂pi1
= − 1
µ
, ∂Xi(.)
∂pi1
= − 2
µ
and ∂Xj(.)
∂pi1
= ∂Xi(.)
∂pj1
= 1
µ
. After expanding,
enforcing symmetry with pi1 = pj1 = p∗1, and setting equal to zero, one obtains
a unique value for p∗1 =
µ−κ
2
. There are no profitable local deviations as the
associated second-order condition ensures local concavity, ∂
2pii
∂p2i1
= − 4
µ
< 0. Then
substituting p∗1 into (3.10), (3.9) and (3.1) provides the unique values for X∗,
p∗2, Q̂∗1 and Q̂∗2 as claimed. For period 2 to be active as assumed, we require
X∗ = 3κ
2µ
< 0.5. This implies µ > 3κ, which further ensures that the equilibrium
is well-defined with non-negative prices.
Second suppose that period 2 is inactive with ψsA = ψsB such that XA(.) +XB(.) =
1. Firm i’s profit function then equals pii(.) = pi1[Q̂i1(pi1, pj1)] which can be
rewritten as follows using (3.7):
pii(.) = pi1[2Qi1(pi1, pj1)] = pi1
[1
2
+
pj1 − pi1
µ
]
(3.16)
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However, to ensure XA(.) +XB(.) = 1, we know from Proposition 3.1 that (3.16)
must be maximised subject to pi1 ≤ κ. After solving and enforcing symmetry, this
leads to a unique local maximum with p∗1 = min{µ2 , κ} and X∗ = 12 . There are no
profitable local deviations because the associated second-order condition ensures
local concavity, ∂
2pii
∂p2i1
= − 2
µ
< 0. When µ > 3κ, we know from above that any
symmetric equilibrium must have X∗ < 0.5 which is inconsistent with this case.
Hence, this case requires µ ∈ (0, 3κ].
Proof of Proposition 3.4. From (3.12), the bias for h ∈ {A,B} is θhA1 (p∗1) =
X∗
Q∗1+X∗
(
ηhA1 (p
∗
1)− ρhA1 (p∗1)
)
, where Q∗1 =
1
2
andX∗ = 1
2
from Proposition 3.3. From
Lemma 3.2, QA1 (.) = XA (.) = 12 +
pB−pA
µ
, such that ηhA2 (p∗1) = ρhA1 (p∗1) =
2p∗1
µ
.
Thus, θhA1 (p∗1) = 0 for h ∈ {A,B}.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. i) From (3.12), the bias for h ∈ {A,B} is θhA1 (p∗1) =
X∗
Q∗1+X∗
(
ηhA1 (p
∗
1)− ρhA1 (p∗1)
)
, where Q∗1 =
1
2
, X∗ = 3κ
2µ
, and p∗1 =
µ−κ
2
from Proposi-
tion 3.3. Given QA1 (.) = 12 +
pB−pA
µ
and XA (.) = 12 −
(
2pA1−pB1−κ
µ
)
from Lemma
3.2 and Proposition 3.1, then ρhA1 (p∗1) =
µ−κ
µ
for h ∈ {A,B}, and ηAA1 (p∗1) = 2(µ−κ)3κ
and ηBA1 (p∗1) =
(µ−κ)
3κ
. Thus, θAA1 (p∗1) =
3(µ−κ)
µ+3κ
−
(
µ−κ
µ
)
=
(
µ−κ
µ
)(
2µ−3κ
µ+3κ
)
and
θBA1 (p
∗
1) =
2(µ−κ)
µ+3κ
−
(
µ−κ
µ
)
=
(
µ−κ
µ
)(
µ−3κ
µ+3κ
)
. Given µ > 3κ > 0, these are both
strictly positive.
ii) From (3.13), the bias in period 2 for h ∈ {A,B} is θhA2 (p∗2) = −X
∗
Q∗2−X∗
(
ηhA2 (p
∗
2)− ρhA2 (p∗2)
)
,
where Q∗2 =
1
2
, X∗ = 3κ
2µ
, and p∗2 =
µ−3κ
2
from Proposition 3.3 such that ηAA2(p∗2) =
ηBA2(p
∗
2) = 0 and ρAA2(p∗2) = ρBA2(p∗2) =
2p∗2
µ
= µ−3κ
µ
. Thus, θhA2 (p∗2) = 1−
(
µ−3κ
µ
)
= 3κ
µ
for h ∈ {A,B}. Given µ > 3κ > 0, these are both strictly positive.
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Proof of Proposition 3.6. Differentiating θAA1(p∗1) =
3(µ−κ)
µ+3κ
−
(
µ−κ
µ
)
with re-
spect to µ and κ yields:
∂θAA1(p
∗
1)
∂µ
=
κ[11µ2−6µκ−9κ2]
µ2(µ+3κ)2
and ∂θAA1(p∗1)
∂κ
= −µ[11µ
2−6µκ−9κ2]
µ2(µ+3κ)2
,
respectively. Note that [11µ2 − 6µκ− 9κ2] can be rewritten as [3κ+(1+2√3)µ][3κ+
(1− 2√3)µ] such that ∂θAA1(p∗1)
∂µ
> 0 and ∂θ
A
A1(p
∗
1)
∂κ
< 0 for all µ > 3κ.
Furthermore, differentiating θBA1(p∗1) =
2(µ−κ)
µ+3κ
−
(
µ−κ
µ
)
with respect to µ and κ
yields:
∂θBA1(p
∗
1)
∂µ
=
κ[7µ2−6µκ−9κ2]
µ2(µ+3κ)2
and ∂θBA1(p∗1)
∂κ
= −µ[7µ
2−6µκ−9κ2]
µ2(µ+3κ)2
,
respectively. Note that [7µ2 − 6µκ− 9κ2] can be rewritten as [3κ+(1+2√2)µ][3κ+
(1− 2√2)µ] such that ∂θBA1(p∗1)
∂µ
> 0 and ∂θ
B
A1(p
∗
1)
∂κ
< 0 for all µ > 3κ.
Finally, differentiating θhA2(p∗2) =
3κ
µ
with respect to µ and κ yields
∂θhA2(p∗2)
∂κ
= 3
µ
> 0
and
∂θhA2(p∗2)
∂µ
= −3κ
µ2
< 0 for h ∈ {A,B}, given µ > 0 and κ > 0.
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Chapter 4
Consumer Stockpiling and Market
Entry
4.1 Introduction
Having studies how own- and cross-price elasticities are incorrectly biased from
ignoring consumer stockpiling behaviour in a duopoly setting in Chapter 3, it
will now be of interest to further investigate the role of number of firms, as most
suitable stockpiling product market are oligopoly market. In the existing literat-
ure, very little remains known about how the number of firms affects consumer
stockpiling behaviour and the consequent elasticity biases. Addressing this omis-
sion is imperative to further understand storable product markets and to help
policymakers know when the exclusion of consumer stockpiling behaviour matters
most.
In this chapter, we consider consumer stockpiling behaviour and the implied elasti-
city biases within an spatial n-firm oligopoly setting. As a primary contribution,
this chapter firstly studies how the number of firms determines consumer stockpil-
ing behaviour and the biases of own- and cross-price elasticities for a fixed level of
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market entry. This chapter then analyses how these conclusions change when free
entry is allowed and the number of firms becomes endogenous. As a secondary
contribution, since consumer stockpiling behaviour involves intra-period demand
shifts that might potentially affect firms’ entry decisions, this chapter studies the
extent to which the excessive entry theorem still applies under consumer stockpil-
ing.
In more detail, we introduce consumer stockpiling into a two-period differentiated
products oligopoly based on Salop circular city model (1979). In each period, each
consumer wishes to consume exactly one unit, but is allowed to purchase a second
unit for future consumption. As consistent with many retail markets, consumers
incur positive transaction costs every time they make a purchase from a firm. This
transaction costs are independent of the number of units bought. Among other
potential sources, such transaction costs can arise from the costs of locating a
product in the supermarket, visiting a firm or ordering a delivery, or the costs of
simply remembering to make a purchase.
We first treat the number of firms as exogenous, and show that for any posit-
ive transaction cost, any symmetric equilibrium must involve positive consumer
stockpiling. This is because transaction cost encourages consumers to stockpile in
advance so that any expected transaction cost in the future can be avoided. We
then offer the result that the total level of stockpiling demand is weakly increasing
in the number of firms. Intuitively, an increase in the number of firms ensures that
the average distance between a consumer and their nearest firm reduces such that
weakly more consumers find it optimal to stockpile.
Following Chapter 3, but with n-firm oligopoly rather than duopoly, we examine
the signs of elasticity biases by comparing the elasticity of true demand, which is
independent from consumer stockpiling behaviour, and that of observed demand,
which derives from consumer stockpiling behaviour. Our findings show that with
positive stockpiling equilibrium, biases of both own- and cross-price elasticities can
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be positive or zero, depending on the number of entrants in the market. When the
number of firms is small, both own- and cross-price elasticities biases are strictly
positive, and strictly increasing in the number of firms. On the contrary, in a
market with large number of firms such that all consumers stockpile, then both
own- and cross-price elasticities biases can be negligible. The implication of this
result is that these biases of elasticity matter most in a market with small number
of firms.
The latter part of this chapter then allows the number of firms to be endogenous.
We first compare the equilibrium number of entrants with the socially efficient
level. The entry of a new firm has several different effects i) it reduces firms’
profits by reducing each firm’s market share and the equilibrium prices in both
periods, ii) it raises consumer surplus by reducing the prices in both periods, and
by (weakly) increasing the level stockpiling such that consumers’ expenditure on
transaction costs also weakly fall. However, despite the extra inter-temporal effects
on consumer stockpiling, we find that the negative effects on firms’ profits always
dominate such that entry is always excessive. Second, and most substantially, we
then revisit the implied elasticity biases under free entry. We show that in a market
with high fixed entry cost (equivalently small endogenous number of firms), the
biases are increasing (decreasing) with product differentiation level (transaction
cost). This confirms that the previous findings of Chapter 3 are robust to free
entry and shows that the biases of own- and cross-price elasticities matter most
in markets with a small number of firms.
The approach we use in this chapter is closely related to Guo and Villas-Boas
(2007). We develop their duopoly model by a) showing how transaction costs
provide a tractable and realistic source of positive stockpiling equilibrium, and b)
by extending it to an oligopoly to consider firms’ entry decisions. In addition, pre-
vious papers that empirically study the biases of price elasticity caused by ignoring
consumer stockpiling behaviour are also relevant. (see Erdem et al, 2003. Hendel
and Nevo, 2006b, and 2013, and Perrone, 2017). As opposed to these papers which
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argue cross-price elasticity is either negative or difficult to measure, we show that
both-own and cross-price elasticity are either positive or zero depending on the
sign and level of equilibrium stockpiling demand. This confirms the robustness of
the results of Chapter 3, but also extends it by examining the role of the number
of firms in the market under both fixed and free entry.
Previous theoretical models of consumer stockpiling in n-firm have been rare in
the previous literature, and have focused on homogeneous product without free
entry. (see Salop and Stiglitz, 1982, Sobel, 1984, and Pesendorfer 2002). These pa-
pers cover several topics, including price dispersion, price discrimination and price
discount. In contrast, we study market entry problem and consumer stockpiling
in a differentiated product n-firm market.
Finally, our study adds to the literature on excessive entry. In the seminal papers
of oligopoly spatial model, Vickery (1964) and Salop (1979) shows that the equi-
librium number of firms is larger than the socially optimal level. Some later liter-
atures also confirm that excessive entry theorem applies in a non-spatial Cournot
competition setting (see Mankiw and Whinston, 1986, Suzumura and Kiyono,
1987), and more papers have used the Salop circle model to analyse the extent to
which excess entry applies in a variety of other settings (e.g. Gu and Wenzel 2009,
2012, 2015. Matsumura and Okamura 2006a, 2006b). The most recent paper is
Chen and Zhang (2018) who study entry problem in a model of consumer search.
In contrast, we revisit the market entry problem by considering it in a dynamic
environment where consumer’s demand varies with their stockpiling decisions and
examine the relationship between the equilibrium and the socially efficient number
of firms.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the model. Section 4.3
assumes a fixed number of firms. It presents the model and stockpiling equilibrium,
before considering how the number of firms affects the implied biases of elasticities.
Section 4.4 then allows the number of firms to be endogenous under free entry.
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It compares the equilibrium number of firms to the socially optimal level, and
then analyses the implications for the elasticity biases. Section 4.5 concludes. All
proofs are in the appendix.
4.2 Model
Consider a market with n ≥ 2 single product firms, i ∈ {2, ..., n} sell a single,
horizontally differentiated, storable product with zero cost over two periods, t =
1, 2. To capture firms’ location, we use Salop’s (1979) circular city framework.
Specifically, there are n ≥ 2 symmetric firms evenly located along the unit-long
circle. Firms incur a fixed entry cost, denoted by f ≥ 0, to enter the market. They
compete in price to sell a single differentiated storable product which can either
be consumed immediately or stockpiled for future consumption. But it can only
be consumed once. Consumers of mass one are uniformly distributed along the
circular city. Consumer’s locations on the circle are fixed throughout the game and
each consumer places a value of gross utility, λ, from consuming one unit of any
product. We make an assumption that consumer’s gross utility λ to be sufficiently
large such that no consumer abstain from buying differentiated product. Define
xi as the distance between consumer’s preferred location and its closest firm, say,
firm i. When this consumer buying from firm i and paying price pi, she derives
utility as follows, where t can be interpreted as a parameter that measures product
differentiation.
ui(pi) = λ− pi − µxi xi ∈ [0, 1
n
]
Similar to Chapter 3, we also assume that consumer’s transactions are costly.
Specifically, each time a consumer makes a purchase of one or more units from
any given firm, she incurs a transaction cost, κ > 0, that is independent of the
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number of units bought. Typical examples include the costs of visiting a firm
or ordering a delivery. Since the appropriate products that fit to this study are
purchased and consumed frequently, any potential inventory cost is normalised to
zero and intertemporal discounting factor is assumed to be zero.
What follows describes the timing of the game. The game consists of t = 1, 2
periods. Particularly, in period 1 each firm sets its period 1 price simultaneously.
Consumers then realise their location and the distance between themselves and
their closest firm, x, and observe the price of each firm before making decisions
about where to buy and how many units to buy. If a consumer buys 1 unit for
period 1 consumption and 1 unit for period 2 consumption, then she will no longer
be active in period 2 market. In period 2, each firm sets period 2 price at the same
time after observing its rivals’ period 1 prices and consumers’ period 1 actions
(whether stockpiled or not). Remaining consumers then observe these prices and
decide from which firm to buy. We look for pure-strategy symmetric equilibria
where the firms set period 1 price, p∗1, and period 2 price, p∗2. Like Chapter 3,
we focus on characterising on the unique local symmetric equilibrium. Hence,
we need only consider local deviations around a potential symmetric equilibrium.
Throughout, we will analyse pricing equilibria by supposing that firm i sets price
pit in period t while all other firms set the same rival price, p−it.
4.3 Fixed Number of Firms
To begin, we treat the number of firms, n, as fixed and exogenous. In Section
4.3.1, we first examine a benchmark case where consumer stockpiling behaviour is
not feasible. Section 4.3.2 then covers the equilibrium analysis, before examining
the implied biases of own- and cross-price elasticities in Section 4.3.3.
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4.3.1 Benchmark
This benchmark considers the case where consumer stockpiling is not feasible.
Hence period 1 and period 2 markets become static and identical. As an assump-
tion of the model, the n firms are symmetrically located along the unit-long circle
such that the distance between each firm is 1
n
. Following Tirole (1988), firm i’s
rivals are the two firms that are located next to itself. Consider a marginal con-
sumer, who is indifferent between buying from firm i and an adjacent firm, denoted
by −i, is x¯ away from firm i and 1
n
− x¯ away from firm −i. If all firms other than
firm i price at p−it, then for this marginal consumer, it follows that,
uit(pit) = u−it(p−it)⇐⇒ λ−pit−µx¯−κ = λ−p−it−µ( 1
n
−x¯)−κ x ∈ [0, 1
n
] (4.1)
The equation above suggests that marginal consumer earns the same utility from
purchasing in either firm i or firm −i. Isolating the expression of x¯ in (4.1) yields,
x¯ =
p−it − pit
2t
+
1
2n
(4.2)
x¯ can be defined similarly as the number of consumers that buy from firm i on
only one side. Adding those who are are located in between firm i and its rival on
the other side firm i’s total demand in period t equals 2x¯.
Qit(pit, p−it) ≡ 2x¯ = p−it − pit
µ
+
1
n
(4.3)
Applying the usual first order condition, p∗ = −Qit(pit, p−it)
Q′it(pit, p−it)
, and solving for the
symmetric response functions gives rise to the symmetric equilibrium price of each
firm pNS∗it =
µ
n
for each period. As each firm has an equilibrium demand of 1
n
per
period, each firm then earns piNS∗ = 2µ
n2
− f in aggregate.
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4.3.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Before proceeding to the main equilibrium analysis, we first cover some period 1
stockpiling preliminaries for a given set of period 1 prices {pi1, p−i1}, and expected
period 2 price {pei2, pe−i2}.
4.3.2.1 Period 1 Preliminaries
Consider a consumer that locates a distance x away from firm i and ( 1
n
− x) away
from an adjacent firm −i. The consumer’s period 1 available options involve three
alternatives. Firstly, a consumer could choose to stockpile from firm i to gain1,
USi = 2ui(pi1) = 2(λ− pi1 − µx)− κ (4.4)
This consumer could also build up inventory by buying one unit from firm i and
stockpiling from another adjacent firm, −i. The utility gained from doing so is
given by,
US−i = ui(pi1)+u−i(p−i1)−2κ = [λ−pi1−µx−κ]+[λ−p−i1−µ(
1
n
−x)−κ] (4.5)
Alternatively, the consumer could choose not to stockpile by purchasing one unit
in each period to gain,
UNS = (λ− pi1 − µx)− κ+Max{ui(pei2), u−i(pe−i2)} − κ (4.6)
We first compare the options of stockpiling from the same store and stockpiling
from different stores. Subtracting (4.5) from (4.4) gives USi − US−i > 0, which
1Quadratic disutility is used to fix the intractability problem of its linear counterpart, arising
in the case of asymmetric locations with even number of firms. Otherwise, quadratic or linear
disutility functions of location model are invariant. See Hoernig (2015).
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suggests that if building up inventory is determined, consumer would always prefer
to stockpile from the same store rather than from two different stores because
stockpiling from the same firm avoids incurring transaction costs repetitively. This
guarantees that consumer who stockpiles from any firm will always be a subset
of consumer who buys from that firm in period 1. We then compare the options
between stockpiling from a single firm and not stockpiling by buying a single unit
in each period. Subtracting UNS from USi gives −pi1 − µx+max{tx+ pei2, µ( 1n −
x) + pe−i2}, which is weakly decreasing in x. This indicates that as x decreases,
the relative desirability of stockpiling from firm i increases. We can now propose
the following:
Lemma 4.1. Consider a consumer located a distance x¯i away from firm i. If this
consumer finds it optimal to stockpile from firm i, then any other consumer located
a distance x ∈ [0, x¯i] away from firm i will also find it optimal to stockpile from
firm i.
Lemma 4.1 helps to characterise the location of marginal consumer. Specifically,
consider an interval of the unit-long circle. This interval can be seen via Figure 4.1.
It includes three firms, firm i and its two adjacent firms, denoted by −i. Define
firm i’s location as 0. Two adjacent firms will be at 1 − 1
n
and 1
n
, respectively.
Since firms other than firm i are acting symmetrically, with out loss of generality
we can just focus on half of Figure 4.1, either [1− 1
n
, 0] or [0, 1
n
]. We denote the
(possibly empty) set of consumers who choose to stockpile from firm i in the first
period as [0, x¯i], the set of consumer who stockpile from firm i’s adjacent firm as
[ 1
n
− x¯−i, 1n ]. Thus, the remaining set [xi, 1n − x¯−i] gives consumers who will be
active in period 2. Based on the different locations of x¯i and x¯−i, we can state the
following regarding firm i’s observed demand in period 1.
Lemma 4.2. Firm i’s observed demand in period 1 is:
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Figure 4.1: Consumer Stockpiling Decisions with Multifirms
Qˆi1(.) =

2Qi1(pi1, p−i1) if x¯i + x¯−i = 1n
Qi1(pi1, p−i1) +Xi(x¯i) if x¯i + x¯−i < 1n
(4.7)
Lemma 4.2 suggests that firm i’s observed demand in period 1 varies with locations
of marginal consumers of both firms, xi and x−i. Firstly, if the location of x¯i and
x¯−i are overlapped such that the set [x¯i, 1n − x¯−i] equals zero and therefore does
not exist, all consumers stockpile by buying two units in period 1. In this way,
firm i′s period 1 observed demand is doubled and equals Qˆi1 = 2Qi1(pi1, p−i1). In
contrast, if x¯i + x¯−i < 1n such that the set [x¯i,
1
n
− x¯−i] is strictly positive, then
firm i′s total demand equals Qˆi1 = Qi1(pi1, p−i1) +Xi(x¯i). A positive measure of
consumers, 1
n
−Xi(xi)−X−i(x−i), does not stockpile in period 1 and will therefore
be active in period 2.
4.3.2.2 Period 2 Market
Given that consumer who stockpiles in period 1 is no longer active in period 2,
from Lemma 4.2, we can state the period 2 market demand as follows
Lemma 4.3. In any symmetric equilibrium, firm i’s total period 2 observed de-
mand, Qˆi2, is:
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Qˆi2(.) =

0 if x¯i + x¯−i = 1n
Qi2(pi2, p−i2)−Xi(x¯i) if x¯i + x¯−i < 1n
(4.8)
If x¯i and x¯−i are overlapped such that x¯i+ x¯−i = 1n , all consumers have stockpiled
and so period 2 is inactive. However, if x¯i + x¯−i < 1n , then consumers with
x ∈ [x¯i, 1n − x¯−i] have not stockpiled and so remain active. As in the benchmark,
any such consumer will then buy one unit from firm i rather than firm −i if buying
from firm i brings more utility. It then follows that firm i’s period 2 observed
demand equals Qi2(pi2, p−i2), from (4.3), minus those who have stockpiled from
firm i in period 1, Xi(x¯i), from (4.8).
4.3.2.3 Firm’s Decisions: Period 2
In the case where period 2 market is active, period 2 market consists of those
who didn’t stockpile in period 1. From the previous Lemma, we know Qˆi2(.) =
Qi2(pi2, p−i2) −Xi(x¯i). Then from the benchmark we know Qit(pit, p−it) ≡ 2x¯ =
p−it−pit
µ
+ 1
n
. Now we can rewrite firm i’s period 2 observed demand function as,
Qˆi2 = [
p−i2 − pi2
µ
+
1
n
−Xi(x¯i)] (4.9)
Accordingly, firm i’s period 2 profit function can be written as
pii2 = pi2Qˆi2(.) (4.10)
Applying the first order condition of firm i’s period 2 profit function yields the
period 2 equilibrium price. We now state the following:
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Lemma 4.4. Suppose x¯i + x¯−i < 1n . Then, provided
1
n
− (4Xi(x¯i)+2X−i(x¯−i))
3
> 0,
the unique period 2 equilibrium has
p∗i2 = µ[
1
n
− 4Xi(x¯i) + 2X−i(x¯−i))
3
] > 0 (4.11)
and Q̂∗i2(.) = Qi2(p∗i2, p∗−i2)−Xi(x¯i) = 2(Xi(x¯i)−X−i(x¯−i))3 + 1n > 0
To characterise the properties of a potential symmetric equilibrium, we need only
consider local deviations. Hence, based on the assumption that all firms other than
firm i set the same price and the period 1 prices of firm i and firm−i are sufficiently
close, their levels of stockpiling are similar, with 1
n
− 4Xi(x¯i)+2X−i(x¯−i))
3
> 0 and
1
n
− 4X−i(x¯−i)+2Xi(x¯−i))
3
> 0. Given this, Lemma 4.4 confirms that all symmetric
firms will have positive period 2 equilibrium prices and demand. Furthermore, it
can be seen that the level of period 2 equilibrium prices are determined by the
level of stockpiling demand. Intuitively, the more consumers stockpile in period
1, the less consumer are active in period 2. Facing less consumer, competing firms
have more incentive to reduce its price. It can also be seen that both period 2
demand and period 2 equilibrium price are negatively related to the number of
firms, n. This is due to the business-stealing effect caused by new entrants.
4.3.2.4 Firm’s Decisions: Period 1
We now start examining the equilibrium levels of stockpiling demand for given
period 1 prices and expected period 2 prices. After this, we solve for period 1
equilibrium.
Equilibrium Stockpiling Demand
Denote Xi(pi1, p−i1, pei2, pej2) as firm i’s equilibrium level of stockpiling demand,
where consumers expectations are correct if pei2 = p∗i2(Xi, X−i).
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Proposition 4.1. Around any symmetric equilibrium, the unique levels of stock-
piling demand, X = {Xi(.), X−i(.)}, equal:
X =

(0, 0)(
3
2 − 3(pi1−κ)µ , 0
)
(
1
n −
(
2pi1−p−i1−κ
µ
)
, 1n −
(
2p−i1−pi1−κ
µ
)) (4.12)
Note that the first line of (4.12) requires pi1 ≥ µn + κ and p−i1 ≥ µn + κ, the
second line requires pi1 < µn + κ and p−i1 ≥ 12
[
µ
n
+ κ+ pi1
]
, the third line requires
pi1 ≤ 12
[
µ
n
+ κ+ p−i1
]
and p−i1 ≤ 12
[
µ
n
+ κ+ pi1
]
.
In period 1, the proof verifies that marginal consumer with distance x¯i away from
firm i optimally compares the cost of stockpiling her second unit of product from
firm i in period 1, and the cost of returning period 2 market to buy her second
unit from firm i. The comparison can be mathematically written as,
USi S UNSi
2(λ− µx¯i − pi1)− κ S (λ− pi1 − µx¯i − κ) + (λ− pei2 − µx¯i − κ) (4.13)
Simplifying yields,
pi1 S pei2 + κ (4.14)
Depending on the level of transaction cost κ, (4.14) gives rise to three different
scenarios. Firstly, if transaction cost κ is sufficiently high such that cost of buying
in period 1 are low, then all consumers find it optimal to stockpile as pi1 < pei2 +κ.
Similarly, if transaction cost κ is sufficiently small, then no consumer finds it
optimal to stockpile as pi1 > pei2 + κ. If the transaction cost κ is on a moderate
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level. As consistent with the bottom line of equation (4.12), there exists a unique
level of equilibrium stockpiling, such that pi1 = pei2(Xi, X−i) +κ. If firm i’s period
1 price was below (above) this level for given levels of Xi and X−i, more (fewer)
consumers would find it optimal to stockpile at firm, which in turn would lower
(raise) the firm’s period 2 equilibrium price until this condition is satisfied.
Equilibrium Prices
Now we examine period 1 market from firms’ side. In period 1 market, firms are
aware of consumer’s strategic intertemporal stockpiling behaviour. Thus, firm’s
profit maximisation problem can be described as,
pii = pi1[Qi1(pi1, p−i1) +X∗i (.)] + p
∗
i2[Qi2(p
∗
i2, p
∗
−i2)−X∗i (.)] (4.15)
where firm i receives period 1 demand Qˆi1 = Qi1(pi1, p−i1) +Xi(.) from (4.7) and
(4.12), and (if active) sets a period 2 equilibrium price p∗i2(.) from (4.11), and
receives a period 2 equilibrium demand Qˆi2 = Qi2(p∗i2, p∗−i2)−Xi(.) from (4.8). To
begin, we can then note the following important result.
Proposition 4.2. In any symmetric equilibrium with κ > 0, each firm receives a
positive level of stockpiling demand.
Proposition 4.2 is consistent with the result of Chapter 3, but is opposite to Guo
and Villas-Boas (2007)’s equilibrium without consumer stockpiling. To get intu-
itions, prices in the benchmark case without consumer stockpiling are equal across
both period 1 and 2, p∗1 = p∗2 =
µ
n
. However, in our main framework, as the a
positive transaction cost κ is introduced, it implies p∗1 < p∗2 + κ such that there
will be more consumers choose to stockpile in advance in an effort of avoiding a
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second period transaction cost. Thus, any symmetric equilibrium with any κ > 0
must involve with positive inventory demand of consumer, X∗i = X∗−i = X∗ > 0.
Proposition 4.3. In any symmetric equilibrium:
i) when the number of firms is high, n ≥ 2µ
3κ
, the unique level of stockpiling demand
is X∗ = 1
n
, where p∗1 = min{µn , κ}, Qˆ∗i1 = 1n +X∗ = 2n , and Qˆ∗i2 = 0. The aggregate
level of stockpiling demand is nX∗ = 1.
ii) when the number of firms is low, n ∈ [2, 2µ
3κ
), the unique level of stockpiling
demand is X∗ = 3k
2µ
∈ (0, 1
n
), where p∗1 =
µ
n
− k
2
, p∗2 =
µ
n
− 3k
2
. The aggregate level
of stockpiling demand is nX∗ = min{3κn
2µ
, 1}.
Proposition 4.3 suggests that whether the equilibrium is a corner solution or in-
terior solution depends on the number of firms within the market. Intuitively,
when the number of firms is large, competition is strong and prices are low rel-
ative to transaction cost because of the strong business-stealing effect, such that
p∗1 ≤ κ holds in equilibrium. From Proposition 4.2, this implies all consumers
optimally stockpile in advance, such that X∗ = 2
n
. Instead, when the number of
firms is small in the market, business-stealing effect is weak. As a result, compet-
ition is weaker such that price is relatively higher than the transaction cost. In
equilibrium, p∗1 = p∗2 + κ holds. Thus, there will be a strict positive proportion of,
but not all, consumers stockpile in advance in period 1. To understand the role of
the number of firms n in equilibrium stockpiling demand in more detail, we state
the following:
Corollary 4.1. In any symmetric equilibrium, the unique level of stockpiling de-
mand of each symmetric firm X∗ is weakly decreasing with n. The aggregate level
of inventory demand nX∗ = min{3κn
2µ
, 1}, is weakly increasing in the number of
firms, n.
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To understand Corollary 4.1, we first consider the case where n is low, n ∈ [2, 2µ
3κ
),
such that a proportion of consumers stockpile. From previous sections, we know
the consumer’s stockpiling decision depend upon (4.14). When n increases, p∗i1
and p∗i2 reduce by the same amount as
∂p∗i1
n
= 1
n
and ∂p
∗
i2
n
= 1
n
. As a result, (4.14)
does not change with n. The equilibrium stockpiling demand, X∗, for each firm
is independent of the number of firms. In contrast, the increase in the number of
firms does (weakly) increase the aggregate equilibrium stockpiling demand, nX∗.
This is because, on average, consumers are now closer to their nearest firm. Now
consider the case where n is larger, n ≥ 2µ
3κ
, such that all consumers stockpile.
Now the storage demand for each firm is 1
n
, which is decreasing with the number
of firms, and the aggregate equilibrium stockpiling demand, nX∗ = 1, remains
independent of n.
4.3.3 Elasticity Biases
In this section, we revisit the issue of the implied elasticities biases caused by
ignoring consumer stockpiling behaviour. As opposed to Chapter 3, here we high-
light the role of number of firms in determining the biases. Specifically, we first
compare the elasticity of true demand, Qit(.), and the elasticity of observed de-
mand that might have incorrectly included stockpiling demand, Qˆit(.). Then we
perform a comparative static analysis of n to study the role of it. The superscript
h = {i, −i} allows us to refer to own-price or cross-price biases respectively:
ρˆhit(.) = −
∂(Qit(.) +Xi(.))
∂pit
pit
(Qit(.) +Xi(.))
and ρˆhit(.) =
∂(Qit(.) +Xi(.))
∂p−it
p−it
(Qit(.) +Xi(.))
(4.16)
Similarly, own- and cross-price elasticity of true demand are given by
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ρhit(.) = −
∂Qit(.)
∂pit
pit
Qit(.)
and ρhit(.) =
∂Qit(.)
∂p−it
p−it
Qit(.)
(4.17)
Own- and cross-price elasticity of stockpiling demand are given by
ηhit(.) = −
∂Xi(.)
∂pit
pi
Xi(.)
and ηhit(.) =
∂Xit(.)
∂p−it
p−it
Xi(.)
We compare the difference between the elasticity of observed demand and that
of true demand to measure the bias that is calculated by incorrectly including
consumers’ stockpiling demand. Following the Proposition 2.1, the bias in period
1 can be expressed as,
θhi1(.) = ρˆ
h
i1(.)− ρhi1(.) =
Xi1(.)
Qi1 +Xi1(.)
(ηhi1(.)− ρhi1(.)) for h = {i, −i} (4.18)
Stockpiling demand, Xi, in (4.18) is positive as consumers are adding inventories
in period 1. Instead, the net stockpiling demand in period 2 is negative, and
equivalent to the amount stockpiled in period 1. As such, the bias in period 2 is
given by,
θhi2(.) = ρˆ
h
i2(.)− ρhi2(.) =
−Xi(.)
Qi2 −Xi(.)(η
h
i2(.)− ρhi2(.)) for h = {i, −i} (4.19)
In what follows, (4.18) and (4.19) will mainly be used in these subsections. Sec-
tion 4.3.3.1 examine the sign of each bias at equilibrium price, p∗t , before Section
4.3.3.2 performs comparative static analysis to see the role of number of firms in
determining such biases. Section 4.4 exploits the comparative static analysis with
free entry number of entering firms to understand when such biases matter most.
Hereafter, to ease exposition, we focus on firm i without loss of generality.
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4.3.3.1 Signs of the Biases
We first consider the case of large number of firms, n ≥ 3µ
2κ
, such that the period
2 market is not active because all consumers chose to stockpile in period 1.
Proposition 4.4. When the number of firms is large, n ≥ 2µ
3k
, the own- and
cross-price elasticity in period 1 are unbiased, such that θhit = ρˆit(.)− ρit(.) = 0
Proposition 4.4 suggests that the elasticities based only on observed demand need
not to be biased when there is positive stockpiling. This is because all consumers in
period 1 stockpile such that Qi1(.) = Xi(.), leading the amount of own- and cross-
price elasticities for observed demand equal to those for true demand, ρhi1(.) =
−∂(2Qi1(.))
∂pi1
pi1
2Qi1(.)
= −∂Qi1(.)
∂pi1
pi1
Qi1(.)
. Thus, the biases are zero. There is also an
alternative way to understand Proposition 4 from (4.18). Given Qi1(.) = Xi(.), it
follows that ηhi1(.) = ρhi1(.). The elements within the bracket of (4.18) are therefore
being zero.
Now we consider the case of small number of firms, where some consumers remain
active in period 2 with a market level of stockpiling demand less than 1, nX∗ < 1.
Proposition 4.5. When the number of firms is small, n ∈ [2, 2µ
3k
):
i) the own- and cross- price elasticities of observed demand in period 1, ρˆii1(p∗1),
and ρˆii1(p∗1) are positively biased, such that θii1(p∗1) =
3(2µ−κn)
3κn+2µ
− 2µ−κn
2µ
> 0 and
θ−ii1 (p
∗
1) =
2(2µ−κn)
2µ+3κn
− 2µ−κn
2µ
> 0;
ii) the own- and cross- price elasticities of observed demand in period 2, ρˆii2(p∗2),
and ρˆ−ii2 (p∗2) are positively biased, such that θii2(p∗2) = θ
−i
i2 (p
∗
2) = 1 − (2µ−3κn2µ ) =
3κn
2µ
> 0
The intuition of Proposition 4.5 is similar to Proposition 3.5. Particularly, in
period 1, positive inventory demand ensures that the slope of the stockpiling de-
mand curve is flatter than the true demand curve, ∂Xi(.)
∂pi1
< ∂Qi1(.)
∂pi1
< 0. Moreover, at
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a given equilibrium price, p∗1, the quantity demanded for true demand is larger than
its counterpart for stockpiling demand, Q∗1 > X∗. Both these effects guarantees
stockpiling demand is more elastic that true demand such that ηii1(.)− ρii1(.) > 0
in (4.18). For period 1 cross-price elasticity bias, even though the marginal re-
sponsiveness of cross-price of stockpiling demand and that of true demand are the
same, ∂Xi(.)
∂p−i1
= ∂Qi1(.)
∂p−i1
> 0, at a given equilibrium price, p∗1, the true quantity de-
manded is again larger than the stockpiling quantity demanded, Q∗1 > X∗. Thus,
cross-price elasticity of storage demand is again higher than that of true demand,
η−ii1 (.)− ρ−ii1 (.) > 0.
Now consider the intuitions of positive biases of period 2 own- and cross-price
elasticities. The elements with in the bracket in (4.19) is negative. This is be-
cause, firstly, stockpiling demand is independent of period 2 price, ηhi2(p∗2) = 0
for h ∈ {i, −i}. In addition, both own- and cross-price elasticities of true de-
mand are positive, ρhi2(p∗2) > 0. Thus, the elements within the bracket in (4.19) is
negative. Due to the negative stockpiling demand in period 2 and only a subset
of consumers stockpile, the ratio of stockpiling demand and observed demand is
negative, −X
∗
i (.)
Q∗i2−X∗i (.) < 0.
4.3.3.2 Comparative Statics
To answer the key question of when the elasticities biases matter the most, we
now perform a comparative static analysis on the number of firms, n. When n is
large, there is no bias. When n is small, we can state the following:
Proposition 4.6. When the number of firms is small, n ∈ [2, 2µ
3κ
);
i) the period 1 own- and cross-price elasticity biases, θii1(p∗1), and θ
−i
i1 (p
∗
1), are
strictly decreasing with the numbers of firms, n.
ii) the period 2 own- and cross-price elasticity biases, θii1(p∗1), and θ
−i
i1 (p
∗
1), are
strictly increasing with the numbers of firms, n.
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Proposition 4.6 suggests that a unit change in n has opposite effects on the elasti-
city biases depending on whether consumers are building up their inventories or
consuming their inventories. Here, we use equation (4.18) and (4.19) to understand
this Proposition. As the number of firms increases, the ratio between stockpiling
demand and observed demand, X∗
Q∗+X∗ , increases (more positive) in period 1 and
decreases (more negative) in period 2. This is because at a given equilibrium price,
p∗t , true demand is negatively related to n while stockpiling demand for each firm
is independent of n. Next, consider how elements within the bracket of (4.18)
and (4.19) vary with n. In period 1, both equilibrium prices and demand for each
firm reduce as the number of firms increases, making storage demand and true
demand more inelastic. However, elasticity of true demand reduces faster than
that of storage demand, ∂η
h
i1
∂n
<
∂ρhi1
∂n
< 0. Thus, ηhi1 − ρhi1 becomes smaller. This
effect is large enough to offset effect that increases X∗
Q+X∗ . In period 2, the negative
storage demand is independent of period 2 price such that ηhi2 = 0. Elasticity of
true demand becomes more inelastic, ∂ρ
h
i2
∂n
< 0. Hence ηhi2 − ρhi2 of (4.19) increases
as n increases. By dominating the effect that reduces the ratio of −X
∗
i
Q∗i2−X∗i , biases
of price elasticity in period 2 increase as the number of firms increase.
4.4 Endogenous Number of Firms
In previous sections, the number of firms, n, was treated as exogenous. We now
make n endogenous by considering free entry. Specifically, we follow standard as-
sumptions (Tirole, 1988) such that each firm incurs fixed cost to enter the market.
We first examine the equilibrium number of active firms when it is endogenously
determined by the zero profit condition. We then consider the welfare implications
by asking whether the optimal number of firms excessive or insufficient. To answer
this, we need to calculate and compare the number of firms that would maximise
the social welfare, and the endogenous number of firms that gives firms zero profit
condition. Finally, to further understand when the biases of price elasticity mat-
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ter most with an equilibrium number of firms, we revisit the comparative static
analysis of price elasticity biases.
4.4.1 Benchmark
First, we consider free entry in the benchmark where stockpiling is prohibited.
Under imperfect competition while free entry is allowed, the optimal number of
firms is determined exogenously. Outsiders keep entering the market until the zero
profit condition is fulfilled. Using the results of Section 4.3.1, this gives
pi∗i =
2µ
n2
− f = 0 (4.20)
Solving (4.20) for n yields the equilibrium number of firms nNS∗ =
√
2µ
f
. this
value is as twice as the standard Salop equilibrium number of firms because we
are considering a two-period market.
Now consider the case in which social planner maximises the welfare by controlling
the level of entry. Define social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and all
firms’ profits. Social welfare can be written as,
Wi(n) = CS(n) + n[pii − f ] (4.21)
After expanding terms, this equals (4.22) below. Intuitively, the consumer welfare
is composed of the gross utility for the purchased product, minus the price of
purchased product, minus the transaction cost incurred, and minus the effect
of product differentiation. This latter component of consumers’ welfare can be
explained as follows. Within each firm’s demand, there are two sets of consumers
located within the interval [0, 1
2n
] away from the firm. Hence, the total effect of
product differentiation per firm equals to 2
∫ 1
2n
0
µxdx, which when multiplied by
the n firms gives 2nµ
∫ 1
2n
0
xdx.
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Wi(n) =
2[λ− p∗NSi − κ− 2n
∫ 1
2n
0
µxdx]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consumers′welfare +
n[pii(p
∗NS
i )− f ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Firms′ profits (4.22)
Inserting benchmark equilibrium price and profit, p∗NSi =
µ
n
and pi∗NS = 2µ
n2
− f ,
and maximising (4.22) with respect to n yields µ
2n2
− f = 0. Solving for n yields
the socially optimal number of firms, nˆ∗NS.
nˆNS∗ =
√
µ
2f
< nNS∗ =
√
2µ
f
We can therefore infer that in the benchmark case, as expected and as consistent
with standard Salop result, there is still excess entry.
4.4.2 Equilibrium Analysis
In this subsection we examine the equilibrium number of firms when stockpiling
is permitted. Recall from previous sections that for a given number of firms, there
may be a corner solution where all consumers stockpile or an interior solution in
which a subset of consumers stockpile. In either case under free entry, the equilib-
rium number of firms will be exogenously determined by a zero profit condition.
Using Proposition 3 and equation (4.15), the zero profit conditions for both firms
can be written as,
pi(n∗)− f = 0⇐⇒

2µ
n2
= f if f < 3κ2
µ
3κ2n2−4κnµ+4µ2
2n2µ
= f if f ∈ [3κ2
µ
, 3κ
2−2κµ+µ2
2µ
]
(4.23)
Solving (4.23) for n yields the equilibrium number of entrants. We now state the
following
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Lemma 4.5. When consumer stockpiling is feasible, the equilibrium number of
firms is i) given by (4.24), and ii) increasing with product differentiation, µ, and
(weakly) decreasing with the level of the transaction cost, κ, and the fixed cost, f .
n∗ =

√
2µ
f
if f < 3κ
2
µ
2µ(
√
2fµ−2κ2−κ)
2fµ−3κ2 if f ∈ [3κ
2
µ
, 3κ
2−2κµ+µ2
2µ
]
(4.24)
First, consider the (upper) case in (4.24) where f < 3κ2
µ
such that the transaction
cost, κ, is relatively high and the fixed cost is relatively low. Here, all consumers
are induced to stockpile in period 1, and the equilibrium number of entrants is
identical to that of the benchmark case,
√
2µ
f
. This is because in this case, the
period 1 market is doubled, Q∗i1 = X∗i . Thus, the market size and equilibrium
prices are identical, leading the equilibrium number of firms to also be identical.
Now consider the other (lower) case in (4.24) where the transaction cost, κ, is now
relatively lower and the fixed cost is relatively higher. Here, only a proportion
of consumers stockpile in advance in equilibrium, and the subsequent prices and
profits are lower than the previous case where all consumers stockpile, and so the
equilibrium number of firms changes expression to 2µ(
√
2fµ−2κ2−κ)
2fµ−3κ2 .
Consistent with conventional wisdom, Lemma 4.5 also suggests that in either
case, the equilibrium number of firms is positively related to the level of product
differentiation, µ, and negatively related to the level of the fixed cost, f . There
is also a (weak) negative relationship with the level of the transaction cost, κ.
Intuitively, when f is relatively small, the transaction cost has no impact on the
number of entrants. However, when f becomes relatively larger, an increase of
in the transaction cost discourages new entry. As κ increases, profit per firm
reduces. This is because symmetric firms need to encourage consumers to buy
by reducing its price to compensate increased transaction cost. Consequently,
equilibrium number of firms has to decrease to maintain the free entry condition,
pi(n) = f .
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4.4.3 Excess Entry
Before considering the impact of the elasticity biases, we are now in the position
to consider whether the excess entry theorem applies under consumer stockpiling.
Normally, there are two different benchmarks to compare the number of firms
under free entry, a first-best benchmark in which the social planner chooses both
the level of entry and the prices charged by firms, and a second-best benchmark
in which the social planner can only control the level of entry, but not prices.
Here, we consider a second-best benchmark. This is because in our framework,
whether the prices can be regulated or not is trivial as the price changes have no
impact on the total quantity purchased by consumers. i.e. demand is inelastic.
We ask whether there is always excess entry into the market as it is the case in
the standard Salop circular model.
Like Section 4.4.1, total social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus
and firm’s profit. Any individual consumer’s welfare is composed of the gross
utility gained from consuming the product, minus the price paid, the transaction
incurred from buying the product, and the effects of product differentiation, while
any individual firm’s welfare is subject to the revenue gained from selling the
product, and entry cost incurred. Thus, the social total welfare maximisation
problem when stockpiling is feasible can be written as the equation (4.25) shown
below, while the second half is the sum of consumer surplus of period 1 demand,
stockpiling demand, and period 2 demand.
W (n) =

λ− p∗1 − κ− 2n
∫ 1
2n
0 µxdx+ n(pi
∗
i − f)
[λ− p∗1 − κ− 2n
∫ 1
2n
0 µxdx] + [nX
∗(λ− p∗1) + nQˆ∗2(λ− p∗2 − κ)− 2n
∫ 1
2n
0 µxdx] + [n(pi
∗
i − f)]
(4.25)
Note that the first line of (4.25) indicates the case in the corner solution where all
consumers stockpile, this case requires f < 3κ2
µ
. The second line of (4.25) indicates
the interior solution where a proportion of consumers stockpile, this case requires
66
f ∈ [3k2
µ
, 3k
2−2kµ+µ2
2µ
].
Since the second line of (4.25) is very long, here I provide a note to specify.
In particular, the first square bracket, [λ − p∗1 − κ − 2n
∫ 1
2n
0
µxdx], indicates the
consumer surplus of the first unit that is purchased in period 1. It shows that each
individual’s utility is given by the match value, λ, minus price of the first unit, p∗1,
minus transaction cost, κ, and the effect of product differentiation, 2n
∫ 1
2n
0
µxdx.
The second square bracket, [nX∗(λ−p∗1)+nQˆ∗2(λ−p∗2−κ)−2n
∫ Q∗1
2
0
µxdx], indicates
the consumer surplus of the second unit, in which some consumers buy in advance
by stockpiling at p∗1 while some consumers buy in period 2 at p∗2. The total
number of consumers who stockpile the second unit in period 1 is nX∗. These
consumers’ utilities are subject to period 1 price, and not subject to transaction
cost. Consumers who buy in period 2 is nQˆ∗2. These consumers’ utilities are subject
to period 2 price and the incurred transaction cost. Therefore, consumer surplus of
stockpiling consumers, nX∗(λ−p∗1), plus consumer surplus of period 2 consumers,
nQˆ∗2(λ− p∗2 − κ), minus the effects of product differentiation, 2n
∫ 1
2n
0
µxdx, equals
the total consumer surplus of the second unit. The third square bracket indicates
the total industry profits.
The social planner would aim to select the number of firms that maximises total
welfare. This is given by the solution of equation (4.26) and defined as the value
of n that maximises W (n).
W
′
(nˆ)− f = 0⇐⇒

µ
2nˆ2
= f if f < 3κ2
µ
3κ2nˆ2+µ2
2nˆ2µ
= f if f ∈ [3k2
µ
, 3k
2−2kµ+µ2
2µ
]
(4.26)
The second order condition W ′′(nˆ) < 0 is satisfied. Thus, the efficient number of
the firms, nˆ, is given by (4.26). If f < 3κ2
µ
, nˆ =
√
µ
2f
. If f ∈ [3k2
µ
, 3k
2−2kµ+µ2
2µ
],
nˆ = µ√
2fµ−3κ2
. Comparing nˆ with the equilibrium number of firms n∗ leads to the
following Proposition,
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Proposition 4.7. There is always excessive entry. The equilibrium number of
firms, n∗, always exceeds the socially optimal number of firms, nˆ.
In line with the original excess entry theorems, (e.g. Vickery 1964, Salop 1979,
Mankiw and Whinston 1986, Suzumura and Kiyono 1987), Proposition 4.7 sug-
gests that the excess entry theorem always applies even in a two-period differen-
tiated oligopoly where consumer can stockpile for future consumption. However,
this result contrasts to some previous studies that develop the Salop circular city
model to suggest a critical value of fixed cost that determines whether there is ex-
cessive or insufficient entry (e.g Matsumura and Okamura, 2006a, Gu and Wenzel,
2012 and 2015). In the general case, the entry of a new firm reduces each firm’s
market share and the equilibrium price under what is known as the business-
stealing effect. On the other hand, from consumers’ perspective, an additional
entrant reduces the equilibrium price and enhances consumer surplus under the
welfare-improving effect. Hence, whether entry is excessive or insufficient, depends
on the relative sizes of these effects.
In our case, the entry of a new firm reduces firms’ profits by reducing each firm’s
market share and the equilibrium prices in both periods. On the other hand,
the additional entrant raises consumer surplus by reducing the prices in both
periods, and also by (weakly) increasing the level stockpiling such that consumers’
expenditure on transaction costs also weakly falls. However, Proposition 4.7 states
that the firm-side business-stealing effect always dominates such that entry is
always excessive, despite the extra inter-temporal effects on consumer stockpiling.2
Hence, a policy implication of this suggests that restrictions on market entry may,
but not necessarily, improve social welfare in an oligopoly storable product market.
2Finally, note that the additional positive effect on consumer surplus through the reduced
transaction cost expenditure only arises when the equilibrium number of firms is small (with
a relatively low transaction cost, κ, and a relatively high fixed cost, f ∈ [ 3k2µ , 3k
2−2kµ+µ2
2µ ]).
Hence, the excessive entry theorem is actually less acute when the equilibrium number of firms
is smaller.
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4.4.4 Elasticity Biases
From Chapter 3 and Section 4.3, we know how biases of own- and cross-price
elasticities vary with respect to product differentiation or transaction cost when
the number of firms n is exogenously given. In this section, we revisit this issue
by inserting the equilibrium level of number of entrants, n∗, in an attempt to
understand when these biases matter most with free entry.
Proposition 4.8. When the number of firms is low, f ∈ [3k2
µ
, 3k
2−2kµ+µ2
2µ
],
i) the period 1 own- and cross-price elasticity biases with equilibrium number of
firms, θh∗i1 (κ, µ) and θh∗i1 (κ, µ), are strictly increasing with product differentiation
level, and decreasing with transaction cost.
ii) the period 2 own- and cross-price elasticity biases with equilibrium number of
firms, θh∗i1 (κ, µ) and θh∗i1 (κ, µ), are strictly decreasing with product differentiation
level and increasing with transaction cost.
Proposition 4.8 shows the findings of Chapter 3 are robust to free entry, and
indicates when the biases matter most with respect to the number of firms under
free entry. To understand Proposition 4.8, first consider the direct effect. As µ
increases, for equation (4.18) and (4.19), both ηi1(p∗1) and ρi1(p∗1) increase. But
ηi1(p
∗
1) increases faster and leads the difference between ηi1(p∗1) and ρi1(p∗1) larger.
Additionally, an increase of µ reduces the ratio X∗
Q∗1+X∗
. The former effect is large
enough to offset the latter in period 1. Therefore, in period 1, keeping n∗ constant,
elasticity bias goes up as µ increases. Instead, in period 2, despite the fact that
the elasticity of storage demand is independent of period 2 prices, ηi2(p∗2) = 0,
the period 2 observed demand increases, ρi2(p∗2) > 0. The effect that reduces the
ration −X∗
Q∗2−X∗ dominates and therefore the bias in period 2 reduces as µ increases.
This is very similar to what we have explained in Chapter 3. Additionally, there
also exists an indirect effect through the equilibrium number of entrants, n∗. From
Lemma 4.5, we know that as µ increases, the equilibrium numbers of entrants n∗
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increases. From Proposition 4.6, we also know that biases of own- and cross- price
elasticity are negatively related with n. Thus, an increase in µ reduces the bias
of own- and cross-price elasticity indirectly. In aggregate, direct effect offsets the
indirect effect. Therefore the biases of own- and cross-price elasticities in period
1 (2) are positively (negatively) related with product differentiation level, µ. The
intuition of transaction cost, κ, is similar to the above discussion of µ. But the
direction of the effect of κ is opposite to that of µ.
4.5 Conclusions
This study has extended a spatial model that incorporates consumer stockpiling
behaviour (Guo and Villas-Boas 2007) into a n-firm oligopoly market. To this end,
we derive a full model of stockpiling in a differentiated oligopoly with endogen-
ous prices over two periods. The result show that in any symmetric equilibrium, a
(weak) subset of consumer stockpile to avoid additional transaction costs. Depend-
ing on the number of firms in the market, the biases of price elasticity can either
be zero or positive. By treating the number of firms as endogenous, we show that
excessive entry theorem still holds when consumers stockpile, but that restrictions
on entry do not necessarily increase social welfare. We finally consider how the
biases of own- and cross-price elasticity vary with respect to transaction cost and
product differentiation under free entry. Our findings suggest that the previous
results of Chapter 3 are robust to free entry. The associated elasticity biases are
strictly increasing in the degree of product differentiation when net stockpiling is
positive, but strictly decreasing in the degree of product differentiation in period
2.
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Appendix:
Proof of Lemma 4.1. From (4.4) and (4.6), any consumer will stockpile from
i if a) USi − US−i > 0, and b) USi − UNSi > 0. Suppose condition a) holds, which
implies (λ − pi1 − µx − κ) − [λ − p−ii − µ( 1n − x) − κ] > 0. It then follows that
UNSi = Ui(pi1) + Max{ui(pei2) + u−i(pe−i2)} − 2κ, such that condition b) can be
rewritten as USi − UNSi = −µx − pi1 + max{µx + pei2, µ( 1n − x) + pe−i2}. This is
then strictly (weakly) increasing in x.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. If x¯i + x¯−i = 1n , all consumers stockpile. Here, using
(4.5), any given consumer will buy two units from i rather than −i in period 1 if
2(λ − pi1 − µx) − κ ≥ 2[λ − p−i1 − µ( 1n − x)]. This comparison reduces down to
that in the benchmark, λ− pi1 − µx > λ− p−i1 − µ( 1n − x). Hence, firm i’s total
period 1 demand equals Q̂i1(.) = 2Qi1(.), where Qi1(pi1, p−i1) coincides with the
benchmark demand, (4.2).
If, instead, x¯i + x¯j < 1n , some consumers only buy one unit in period 1. As in
the benchmark, such consumers will buy one unit from firm i rather than −i if
ui(pi1) − κ ≥ u−i(pi1) − κ and one can define x¯ as the value of x¯+i = pi1 − p−i1
at which such a consumer would be indifferent. Hence, a total of Qi1(pi1, p−i1)
consumers buy from firm i, of which Qi1(pi1, p−i1) − Xi consumers buy one unit
and Xi(x¯i) consumers buy two units, such that total demand equals Q̂i1(.) =
Qi1(pi1, p−i1) +Xi(x¯i).
Proof of Lemma 4.3. If x¯i+ x¯−i < 1n , all consumers stockpile and so Q̂i2(.) = 0.
If instead, x¯i + x¯−i < 1n , then consumers with x ∈ (x¯i, x¯−i) did not stockpile and
so remain active. As in the benchmark, any such consumer will then buy one unit
from firm i rather than −i if ui(pi2)− κ ≥ u−i(p−i2)− κ, and one can define x¯2 as
the value of x¯2 = pi2−p−i2 at which such a consumer would be indifferent. Around
71
any symmetric equilibrium, x¯2 ∈ (x¯i, x¯−i). Hence, there is a positive measure of
consumers with x ∈ (x¯i, x¯j) that strictly prefer to buy from firm j and a positive
measure of consumers with x ∈ (x¯i, x¯2) that strictly prefer to buy from firm i, and
a measure of consumer with x ∈ (x¯2, x¯−i) that strictly prefer to buy from firm
−i . This implies that firm i′s total period 2 demand is equal to the benchmark
demand, Qi2(pi2, p−i2) from (4.2), minus those consumers that stockpiled from firm
i in period 1, Xi(x¯i) from (4.8).
Proof of Lemma 4.4. Suppose x¯i + x¯−i < 1n . Then in any symmetric equilib-
rium, it must be the case that x¯2 ∈ (x¯i, x¯−i) such that both firms have posit-
ive demand, where x¯2 is defined as consumer who is indifferent between buying
from firm i and −i. Then one can use pii2(.) = pi2Q̂i2(.) with (4.11) to de-
rive the firms’ period 2 best responses for given stockpiling levels, p∗i2(p−i2) =
p−i2
2n
+ µ
2n
(
1
2
−Xi(x¯i)
)
. Solving simultaneously yields the unique period 2 equilib-
rium prices, p∗i2 = µ[
1
n
− 4Xi(x¯i)+2X−i(x¯−i)
3
], and substituting these back into (4.9)
gives Qi2 =
(Xi(x¯i)−X−i(x¯−i))
3
+ 1
n
.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Having derived period 2 equilibrium prices, we first
consider consumers’ stockpiling decisions, before deriving the equilibrium levels of
stockpiling demand as a function of period 1 prices in (4.12).
First, consider consumers’ stockpiling decisions and initially suppose that each
firm has positive period 2 demand with x¯2 ∈ (x¯i, x¯−i). This implies that a con-
sumer makes her stockpiling decision by comparing i) the net marginal benefits
of stockpiling from firm i, with ii) the net marginal benefits of waiting to buy
from firm i, rather than firm −i, in period 2. From Section 4.3.2.1, this implies
USi = U
NS
i . By construction, the consumer who is indifferent between stockpiling,
such that USi −UNSi = 0. Hence, this indifference requires pi1 = p∗i2 (Xi, X−i) + κ.
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We are now in a position to derive the equilibrium levels of stockpiling demand
as a function of period 1 prices. First, consider the top line of (4.12). Here,
pi1 > p
∗
i2 (0, 0)+κ and p−i1 > p∗−i2 (0, 0)+κ such that no consumer finds it optimal
to stockpile, Xi = X−i = 0. From (4.11), p∗i2(0, 0) =
µ
n
and so this case occurs
when pi1 > µn + κ and p−i1 >
µ
n
+ κ.
Second, consider the bottom line of (4.12). Here, pi1 ≤ p∗i2
(
1
n
, 1
n
)
+ κ and p−i1 ≤
p∗−i2
(
1
n
, 1
n
)
+κ such that all consumers find it optimal to stockpile, Xi = X−i = 1n .
Period 2 prices are unspecified as period 2 is inactive. However, if the marginal
consumer at x¯i = 0 and x¯−i = 1n were to deviate from stockpiling, we know from
(4.11) that she should rationally expect zero period 2 prices, limXi→ 1np
∗
i2
(
Xi,
1
n
)
=
0. Hence, this case occurs when pi1 ≤ κ and pj1 ≤ κ.
Third, consider the middle line of (4.12). Here, there exists a unique level of
equilibrium stockpiling, Xi(.) ∈ (0, 1n) and X−i(.) ∈ (0, 1n), such that pi1 =
p∗i2 (Xi, X−i) + κ holds for each firm. To find such Xi(.) and X−i(.), one can
insert p∗i2 from (4.11) to obtain
Xi(.) =
3(κ− pi1)
4µ
+
3
4n
− X−i
2
(4.27)
After deriving a similar equation for X−i(.) and solving simultaneously, one finds
a unique level of Xi(.) = 1n −
(
2pi1−pj1−κ
µ
)
. For Xi ∈ (0, 1n), we require pi1 ∈(
µ
n
+ κ, 1
2
[
µ
n
+ κ+ p−i1
]]
for each firm.
Finally, note that the levels of stockpiling and associated conditions in (4.12) are
continuous as i) 1
n
−
(
2pi1−p−i1−κ
µ
)
= 1
n
when pi1 = p−i1 = κ, ii) 1n−
(
2pi1−p−i1−κ
µ
)
=
0 when pi1 = p−i1 = µn + κ.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. From (4.12), Xi = X−i = 0 necessarily requires
pi1 >
µ
n
+ κ and p−i1 > µn + κ. However, we know from the benchmark analysis
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that Xi = X−i = 0 is consistent with p∗1 =
µ
n
. This then leads to a contradiction
as p∗1 =
µ
n
< µ
n
+ κ for all κ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. First suppose that period 2 is active with x¯i+ x¯−i <
1
n
such that Xi(.) + X−i(.) < 1n . In any symmetric equilibrium each firm has
positive period 2 demand with x¯2 ∈ (x¯i, x¯−i). Using (4.8) and (4.4), firm i’s profit
function from can then be rewritten as
pii = pi1[Qi1(pi1) +X
∗
i (pi1)] + p
∗
i2[Qi2 −X∗i (pi1)]
Applying the first order condition with respect to pi1 and set it equals to zero, one
obtains a unique value for p∗1 =
µ
n
− κ
2
. There are no profitable local deviations
as the associated second-order condition ensures local concavity, ∂
2pii
∂p2i1
= −2n
µ
< 0.
Then substituting p∗1 into (4.12), (4.4) and (4.2) provides the unique values for
X∗, p∗2, Q̂∗1 and Q̂∗2 as claimed. For period 2 to be active as assumed, we require
X∗ = 3κ
2µ
. This implies 2 ≤ n < 2µ
3κ
, which further ensures that the equilibrium is
well-defined with non-negative prices.
Second suppose that period 2 is inactive with x¯i + x¯−i = 1n such that Xi(.) +
X−i(.) = 1. Firm i’s profit function then equals pii(.) = pi1[Q̂i1(pi1, p−i1)] which
can be rewritten as follows using
pii = pi12[Qi1(pi1) +Xi(pi1)]
However, to ensure Xi(.) + X−i(.) = 1n , we know from Proposition 4.1 that profit
maximisation function must be maximised subject to pi1 ≤ κ. After solving and
enforcing symmetry, this leads to a unique local maximum with p∗1 = min{µn , κ}
and X∗ = 2
n
. There are no profitable local deviations because the associated
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second-order condition ensures local concavity, ∂
2pii
∂p2i1
= −n
µ
< 0. When 2 ≤ 2µ
3κ
< n,
we know from above that any symmetric equilibrium must have X∗ < 1
n
which is
inconsistent with this case. Hence, this case requires n ≥ 2µ
3κ
.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. The bias is θhi1 (p∗1) =
X∗
Q∗1+X∗
(
ηhi1 (p
∗
1)− ρhi1 (p∗1)
)
for
h ∈ {i, −i}, where Q∗1 = 1n and X∗ = 1n from Proposition 4.3. From Lemma 4.2,
Qi1 (.) = Xi (.) =
1
2
+ p−i−pi
µ
, such that ηhi2 (p∗1) = ρhi1 (p∗1) =
2p∗1
µ
. Thus, θhi1 (p∗1) = 0
for h ∈ {i, −i}.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. i) From (4.18), the bias for h ∈ {i, −i} is θhi1 (p∗1) =
X∗
Q∗1+X∗
(
ηhi1 (p
∗
1)− ρhi1 (p∗1)
)
, where Q∗1 =
1
2
, X∗ = 3κ
2µ
, and p∗1 =
µ
n
− κ
2
from Propos-
ition 4.3. Given Qi1 (.) = 1n +
p−i−pi
µ
and Xi (.) = 1n −
(
2pi1−p−i1−κ
µ
)
from Lemma
4.2 and Proposition 4.1, then θhi1 (p∗1) =
3(2µ−κn)
3κn+2µ
− 2µ−κn
2µ
= (κn−2µ)(3κn−4µ)
2µ(3κn+2µ)
and
θhi1 (p
∗
1) =
2(2µ−κn)
2µ+3κn
− 2µ−κn
2µ
= (κn−2µ)(3κn−2µ)
2µ(3κn+2µ)
. Given 2 ≤ n < 2µ
3κ
, these are both
strictly positive.
ii) From (4.19), the bias in period 2 for h ∈ {i, −i} is θhi2 (p∗2) = −X
∗
Q∗2−X∗
(
ηhi2 (p
∗
2)− ρhi2 (p∗2)
)
,
where Q∗2 =
µ
n
, X∗ = 3κ
2µ
, and p∗2 =
µ
n
− 3κ
2µ
from Proposition 4.3 such that
ηhi2(p
∗
2) = η
h
i2(p
∗
2) = 0 and ρhi2(p∗2) = ρhi2(p∗2) =
2p∗2
µ
= µ−3κn
µ
. Thus, θhi2 (p∗2) =
1 −
(
µ−3κn
µ
)
= 3κn
µ
for h ∈ {i, −i}. Given 2 ≤ n < 2µ
3κ
, these are both strictly
positive.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. This can be proved by taking first order derivatives
of θhit(p∗t ) with respect to n, for h ∈ {i, −i},
∂θii1(p
∗
1)
∂n
=
κ
2µ(3κn+ 2µ)2
[9κ2n2 + 12κnµ− 44µ2]
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Note that 9κ2n2 + 12κnt−44µ2 can be rewritten as [3κn+ 2µ+ 4√3µ][3κn+ 2µ−
4
√
3µ], which is negative, such that ∂θ
i
i1(p
∗
1)
∂n
< 0 for all n ∈ [2, 2µ
3κ
).
Furthermore, differentiating θ−ii1 (p∗1) =
2(2µ−κn)
2µ+3κn
− 2µ−κn
2µ
= (κn−2µ)(3κn−2µ)
2µ(3κn+2µ)
with
respect to n yields:
∂θ−ii1 (p
∗
1)
∂n
=
κ
2µ(3κn+ 2µ)
[9κ2n2 + 12κnµ− 28µ2]
Note that 9κ2n2 + 12κnµ − 28µ2 can be rewritten as [3κn + 2µ + 4√2µ][3κn +
2µ− 4√2µ], which is negative, such that ∂θ−ii1 (p∗1)
∂n
< 0 for all n ∈ [2, 2µ
3n
).
Finally, differentiating θhi2(p∗2) =
3κn
µ
with respect to n yields
∂θhi2(p∗2)
∂n
= 3κ
µ
> 0 for
all n ∈ [2, 2µ
3n
).
Proof of Lemma 4.5 . From Proposition 4.3, when 2 ≤ n < 3κ
2µ
, refer to the
interior solution where X∗ < 1
n
. For the interior solution, since firm’s profit pi∗i
is strictly deceasing with n, ∂pi
∗
i
∂n
= 2(κn−2µ)
n3
< 0 (since κ < 2µ
3n
, κn − 2µ < 0 and
∂pi∗i
∂n
< 0), the maximum relevant entry cost is given when n = 2. Denote this cost
by f¯ . Further, from another constraint condition κ < 2µ
3n
, the minimum entry cost
can be calculated as n = 2µ
3k
. Denote this cost by f . Now, the interior solution
requires: f := 3k2
µ
< f ≤ 3k2−2kµ+µ2
2µ
:= f¯ . f¯≥ f since f¯−f = (µ+ κ)(µ− 3κ) ≥ 0
for all n ∈ [2, 2µ
3κ
) and. When f < f , refer to corner solution where X∗ = 2
n
.
Solving the (4.23) for n yields n∗ =
√
2µ
f
, when f < 3κ2
µ
and n∗ = 2µ(±κ+
√
2fµ−2κ2)
2fµ−3κ2 when
f ∈ (3k2
µ
, 3k
2−2kµ+µ2
2µ
]. The conditions of f ∈ (3k2
µ
, 3k
2−2kµ+µ2
2µ
] guarantees there is
only one positive solution of n∗ = 2µ(±κ+
√
2fµ−2κ2)
2fµ−3κ2 .
(ii). Note that the optimal numbers of firm , n∗, must be calculated whenpi(n∗, κ, µ) =
f holds. We first consider the impact of product differentiation level µ. Keep κ
and f constant, as a unit of µ increases, the profit, pi(n∗, κ, µ) has to increase,
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such that pi(n∗, κ, µ) > f . The zero profit condition can be maintained if optimal
numbers of firm, n∗, increase since ∂pi
∗(.)
∂n∗ < 0. Therefore, an increase in t increases
the optimal numbers of firm, ∂n∗
∂µ
> 0. The intuition of the impact of κ is similar,
but opposite to that of µ. For example, as κ increases, the equilibrium profit has
to decrease such that, pi(n∗, κ, µ) < f . To re-achieve zero profit condition, n∗has
to decrease. Thus, an increase in transaction cost reduces the optimal numbers
of firm, ∂n∗
∂κ
< 0. The implication of entry cost is easier to obtain. From (4.23),
we know pi(n∗, κ. , µ) = f . As f increases, the left hand side, pi(n∗, κ, µ), has to
increase. Keep κ and µ constant, this is only possible when n∗decreases. Hence,
an increase of entry cost reduces the optimal numbers of firm, ∂n∗
∂f
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.7 . The social planners aim to control the number of
firm n to maximise the social welfare. The objective function is given by (4.25),
W (n) =

λ− p∗1 − κ− 2n
∫ 1
2n
0 µxdx+ n(pi
∗
i − f)
[λ− p∗1 − κ− 2n
∫ 1
2n
0 µxdx] + [nX
∗(λ− p∗1) + nQˆ∗2(λ− p∗2 − κ)− 2n
∫ Q∗1
2
0 µxdx] + [n(pi
∗
i − f)]
(4.28)
Note that the first line of (4.25) indicates the case in the corner solution where
all consumers stockpile, this case requires f < 3κ2
µ
. In this case, p∗1 =
µ
n
, pi∗i =
2µ
n2
. Applying the normal first order condition to W (n) and reconstructing yield,
µ
2nˆ2
− f = W ′(nˆ)− f = 0. Solving for nˆ gives nˆ =
√
µ
2f
.
The second line of (4.25) indicates the interior solution where a proportion of
consumers stockpile, this case requires f ∈ [3k2
µ
, 3k
2−2kµ+µ2
2µ
]. In this case, p∗1 =
µ
n
− κ
2
, p∗2 =
µ
n
− 3κ
2
. X∗ = 3κ
2µ
, Qˆ∗2 =
1
n
− 3κ
2µ
, pi∗i =
3κ2n2−4κnµ+4µ2
2n2µ
. Applying
the normal first order condition to W (n) and reconstructing yield, 3κ
2n2+µ2
2n2µ
− f =
W ′(nˆ)− f = 0. Solving for nˆ gives nˆ = µ√
2fµ−3κ2
.
To compare the n∗ and nˆ, we just need to compare (4.26) and (4.23). Since g(n) is
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decreasing, nˆ > (=, <)n∗ if W ′(nˆ) > (=, <)f . Since W ′(nˆ) = f , W ′(nˆ) > (=, <)f
is equivalent toW ′(n∗) > (=, <)pi(n∗). SinceW ′(n) < pi(n)3, we have nˆ < n∗.
Proof of Proposition 4.8. i) From Proposition 4.5, we know the biases of own-
and cross-price elasticities in period 1 are θii1(p∗1) =
3(2µ−κn)
3κn+2µ
− 2µ−κn
2µ
> 0 and
θ−ii1 (p
∗
1) =
2(2µ−κn)
2µ+3κn
− 2µ−κn
2µ
> 0. Substituting equation (4.23) into θii1(p∗1) and
θ−ii1 (p
∗
1) yields the biases of own- and cross-price elasticities with equilibrium num-
bers of entrants in period 1, θhi1(n∗, κ, µ) for h ∈ {i, −i}, where n∗is also a function
of κ, and µ.
Take the first order derivatives of θii1(n∗, κ, µ) w.r.t κ yields
∂θii1(n
∗, κ, µ)
∂κ
=
∂θii1(n, κ, µ)
∂κ
+
∂θii1(n, κ, µ)
∂n
+
∂n∗(κ)
∂κ
∂θii1(n
∗, κ, µ)
∂κ
=
n(9κ2n2 + 12κnµ− 44µ2)
2µ(3κn+ 2µ)2
+
κ(9κ2n2 + 12κnµ− 44µ2)
2µ(3κn+ 2µ)2
∂n
∗(κ, µ)
∂κ
∂θii1(n
∗, κ, µ)
∂κ
=
(9κ2n2 + 12κnµ− 44µ2)
2µ(3κn+ 2µ)2
 [n+ κ∂n
∗(κ, µ)
∂κ
]
∂θii1(n
∗, κ, µ)
∂κ
=
(9κ2n2 + 12κnµ− 44µ2)
2µ(3κn+ 2µ)2
 [(−4µ
2f)[−(κ−√2fµ− 2κ2)2]√
2fµ− 2κ2(2fµ− 3κ2)2
From the proof of Proposition 4.6, we know the first term on RHS is negative.
Thus, on RHS, the first term is negative, the second term is positive, we can infer
that ∂θ
i
i1(n
∗, κ, µ)
∂κ
< 0.
3g(n)− pi(n) = 4κn−3t2n2 . Provided that interior solution requires n < 2t3κ , g(n) > pi(n)
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Take the first order derivatives of θii1(n∗, κ, µ) w.r.t µ yields
∂θii1(n
∗, µ)
∂µ
=
∂θii1(n, µ)
∂µ
+
∂θii1(n, µ)
∂µ
+
∂n∗(µ)
∂µ
∂θii1(n
∗, µ)
∂µ
= −κn(9κ
2n2 + 12κnµ− 44µ2)
2µ2(3κn+ 2µ)2
+
κµ(9κ2n2 + 12κnµ− 44µ2)
2µ2(3κn+ 2µ)2
 ∂n
∗(µ)
∂µ
∂θii1(n
∗, µ)
∂µ
=
κ(9κ2n2 + 12κnµ− 44µ2)
2µ2(3κn+ 2µ)2
 [(2µ
2f)[−(√2fµ− 2κ2 − κ)2]√
2fµ− 2κ2(2fµ− 3κ2)2
From the proof of Proposition 4.6, we know the first term on RHS is negative.
Thus, on RHS, the first term is negative, the second term is negative, we can infer
that ∂θii1(n
∗, κ, µ)
∂µ
> 0.
Take the first order derivatives of θ−ii1 (n∗, κ, µ) w.r.t κ yields
∂θ−ii1 (n
∗, κ, µ)
∂κ
=
∂θ−ii1 (n
∗, κ)
∂κ
+
∂θ−ii1 (n
∗, κ)
∂n
+
∂n∗(κ)
∂κ
∂θ−ii1 (n
∗, κ, µ)
∂κ
=
n(9κ2n2 + 12κnµ− 28µ2)
2µ(3κn+ 2µ)2
+
κ(9κ2n2 + 12κnµ− 28µ2)
2µ(3κn+ 2µ)2
 ∂n
∗(κ)
∂κ
∂θ−ii1 (n
∗, κ, µ)
∂κ
=
(9κ2n2 + 12κnµ− 28µ2)
2µ(3κn+ 2µ)2
 [n∗ + κ∂n
∗(κ)
∂κ
]
∂θ−ii1 (n
∗, κ, µ)
∂κ
=
(9κ2n2 + 12κnµ− 28µ2)
2µ(3κn+ 2µ)2
 [(−4µ
2f)[−(κ−√2fµ− 2κ2)2]√
2fµ− 2κ2(2fµ− 3κ2)2
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From the proof of Proposition 4.6, we know the first term on RHS is negative.
Thus, on RHS, the first term is negative, the second term is positive, we can infer
that ∂θ
−i
i1 (n
∗, κ, t)
∂κ
< 0.
Take the first order derivatives of θ−ii1 (n∗, κ, µ) w.r.t µ yields
∂θ−ii1 (n
∗, κ, µ)
∂µ
=
∂θ−ii1 (n
∗, µ)
∂µ
+
∂θ−ii1 (n
∗, µ)
∂n
+
∂n∗(µ)
∂µ
∂θ−ii1 (n
∗, κ, µ)
∂µ
= −κn(9κ
2n2 + 12κnµ− 28µ2)
2µ2(3κn+ 2µ)2
+
κµ(9κ2n2 + 12κnµ− 28µ2)
2µ2(3κn+ 2µ)2
∂n
∗(µ)
∂µ
∂θ−ii1 (n
∗, κ, µ)
∂µ
=
κ(9κ2n2 + 12κnµ− 28µ2)
2t2(3κn+ 2µ)2
 [∂n
∗(µ)
∂µ
 µ− n∗]]
∂θ−ii1 (n
∗, κ, µ)
∂µ
=
κ(9κ2n2 + 12κnµ− 28µ2)
2µ2(3κn+ 2µ)2
 [(2µ
2f)[−(√2fµ− 2κ2 − κ)2]√
2fµ− 2κ2(2fµ− 3κ2)2
From the proof of Proposition 4.6, we know the first term on RHS is negative.
Thus, on RHS, the first term is negative, the second term is negative, we can infer
that ∂θ
−i
i1 (n
∗, κ, µ)
∂µ
> 0.
ii) From Proposition 4.5, we know biases of own- and cross-price elasticities in
period 2 are the same, θii2(p∗2) = θ
−i
i2 (p
∗
2) =
3κn
2µ
. Inserting equation (4.23) yields
biases of elasticity in period 2 with equilibrium level of entrants.
θh∗i2 (κ, µ) =
3κ(−κ+√2fµ− 2κ2)
2fµ− 3κ2 h ∈ {i, −i}
Take the first order derivatives of θh∗i2 (κ, t) w.r.t κ and t yields,
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∂θh∗i2 (κ, µ)
∂κ
=
−6fµ[−(√2fµ− 2κ2 − κ)2]√
2fµ− 2κ2(2fµ− 3κ2)2 > 0 h ∈ {i, −i}
∂θh∗i2 (κ, µ)
∂µ
=
3fk[−(√2fµ− 2κ2 − κ)2]√
2fµ− 2κ2(2fµ− 3κ2)2 < 0 h ∈ {i, −i}
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Chapter 5
Consumer Stockpiling as a Form of
Behavioural Based Price
Discrimination
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we continue to investigate consumer stockpiling behaviour. One
important and prevalent feature of this is that consumers who have stockpiled
become inactive in the future. Hence, this allows seller to recognise those buyers
that have not stockpiled and to price discriminate between consumers based on
their past stockpiling behaviours.
Despite the literature of behavioural-based price discrimination (BBPD) having
received a wide attention in recent years, analysis of such stockpiling-based BBPD
remains rare. Moreover, associated welfare analysis remains ambiguous in the lit-
erature. Addressing these omissions is important for the implications of consumer
policy in relevant market.
This chapter aims to help fill these gaps. It makes two main contributions. Firstly,
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it provides a dynamic model that considers consumer stockpiling behaviour. In
equilibrium we show how consumer stockpiling can be used by firm as a special
device to perform BBPD against consumers. Secondly and more substantially, we
provide a welfare analysis of such effects of BBPD, and demonstrate that such
price discrimination through stockpiling always improves both consumer surplus
and total welfare. Hence, policymakers should not be concerned by such a form
of price discrimination.
More specifically, we borrow the random utility choice model (Perloff and Salop
1985) to propose a two-period differentiated monopoly that incorporates consumer
stockpiling behaviour. In each period, each consumer wishes to consume at most
one unit, but is allowed to purchase the second unit to stockpile for future con-
sumption. If consumers purchase in period 2, then a unit of transaction cost is
incurred.
The model suggests that in any equilibrium, there is positive consumer stockpiling.
Depending on the level of product differentiation, there are two cases in which all
consumers stockpile and one case in which a proportion of consumers stockpile.
In the corner solutions, all consumers stockpile in advance to save the expected
expenditure on transaction cost in period 2. The firm endogenously sets a profit
maximised price when the product differentiation level is sufficiently low relative
to transaction cost. When the product differentiation level is moderate relative to
transaction cost, this profit maximised price is constraint and thus the firm sets a
lower price than the benchmark case. In the interior case where the level of product
differentiation is higher relative to the transaction cost, consumers with higher
match value stockpile in period 1, leaving those with low match value being active
in period 2. Here, both period 1 and period 2 prices are lower than the benchmark
case. This is because the firm needs to charge a lower price to low match value
consumers in period 2. Then, in period 1 pricing, the firm needs to set its period
1 price higher than the period 2 price to sustain positive consumer stockpiling
such that it can segment consumers to different groups according to their match
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value. This shows how the firm uses stockpiling as a device to identify consumers
by their match values and charges discriminating prices against consumers.
We then examine the welfare effects. Particularly, we compare the welfare effects
of BBPD with that of the normal pricing scheme. Despite some previous literat-
ure suggests that welfare effects are difficult to capture in a model of consumer
stockpiling (Hendel and Nevo, 2013). Here, we provide a clear prediction relative
to normal pricing benchmark that being able to stockpile always increases both
firm’s profits and consumers surplus. This is because with BBPD, i) consumers
can buy at lower prices, and ii) consumers can save the transaction cost. It also
increases the firm’s profits. This is because even if performing BBPD means to
charge lower prices than normal pricing scheme, profit loss can be compensated
by the increased sale.
Finally, we provide a brief extension of an alternative transaction cost assumption.
It was originally assumed consumers to incur transaction cost in period 2. Here, it
is modified to be incurred for the second trip only. In this extension, we show how
this alternative makes no difference to the welfare effects of BBPD if we assume
market coverage.
As a bi-product, the findings of this chapter can also be used as an alternative
explanations of price discrimination on some other industries that exist long-term
contracts. These contracts allow consumers to pay a fixed-price in advance for the
services and products that they receive in the future. Similar to consumer stock-
piling, these contracts induce future demand to be shifted forward. It then follows
that the monopolist can identify its previous consumers. Given this, the mono-
polist may choose to charge new consumers a different price. Common examples
include telecommunication markets, gyms membership, magazine subscriptions
and bank services.
In regards to the literature, this chapter firstly relates to the literature on consumer
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stockpiling. There are some marketing literature that focuses on the underestim-
ation of increased demand from stockpiling in a price promotion period. (See
Gupta, 1988; Bell et al, 1999; Gedenk et al, 2010; etc.). However, this does not
allow for endogenous pricing and therefore is insufficient for an analysis of price
discrimination. For some other studies that allow for endogenous pricing (e.g.
Anton and Das Varma, 2005; Hosken and Reiffen, 2007; Guo and Villas-Boas,
2007), they either consider a quantity competition or considers equilibria in which
consumers don’t stockpile. This limits an analysis of welfare effects of stockpil-
ing. Different from these above-mentioned paper, Hendel and Nevo (2003) study
intertemporal price discrimination when consumers can store for future consump-
tion. There are two types of consumers: price-sensitive consumer who stockpile
for future, and less price-sensitive consumers who do not. Their result suggests
that the welfare effect of BBPD is ambiguous, while we provide a clear and crisp
result that how BBPD can strictly increase consumer surplus and total welfare.
More broadly, this Chapter is related to the wider literature on BBPD. Rossi et al.
(1996) has pointed out that firms in many industries can price discriminate on the
basis of purchase history of consumers. Since then, BBPD becomes a hot topic in
the field of industrial organisation and quantitative marketing. In the literature,
apart from some comprehensive surveys made by Armstrong (2006) and Fuden-
berg and Villas-Boas (2007). Most studies on BBPD focus on competitive price
discrimination. Some of them focuses on consumer poaching where firm charges
one price to its loyal consumer and a lower price to its rival’s consumer. (see
Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; Hawswald and Marquez, 2006; Villas-Boas, 1999).
Some other papers connect switching cost and BBPD (Chen, 1997; Shaffer and
Zhang, 2000; and Taylor, 2003). They suggest that firm offers discounted price to
compensate switching cost and thus gains less profits. Villas-Boas (2004) examines
a monopolist selling to overlapping generations of heterogeneous consumers. The
equilibrium involves cycles in price being charged to new consumers. For the wel-
fare, he draws a result that the monopolist is worse off than if it could not perform
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price discrimination from recognising previous consumers. Jing (2011) considers
a monopolist selling experienced product market where consumers’ valuation can
only be fully understood after purchase. Welfare effects is subject to the condition
of the market. Our study differs from two perspectives. First, by solely focusing
on stockpiling behaviour, we show how it can be used as devices towards BBPD,
and secondly, we provide a welfare analysis of such effects of BBPD. Second, we
demonstrate that that such price discrimination through stockpiling always im-
proves both consumer surplus and total welfare.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the model. Section 5.3 and
5.4 present the main equilibrium analysis, before Section 5.5 provides the analysis
of welfare effects and Section 5.6 shows an extension of alternative assumption of
transaction cost. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
5.2 Model
5.2.1 Assumptions
Consider a single product monopoly with zero production costs. The firm sells
storable product over two periods, t = 1, 2. There is a unit mass of risk-neutral
consumers with quasi-linear preferences, each of whom consumes at most one
unit of the product per period. The market is not fully covered in a sense that
consumers may choose not to buy at all in any given period. For a given price
pi, consumer m’s net utility of consuming one unit is um = εm − pi, where ε is a
consumer specific match value. Each match value, ε, that remains fixed throughout
the game and is independently distributed across consumers with G(ε).We assume
G(ε) is continuous and twice differentiable on [0, b] where b > 0. In particular, we
focus on the uniform distribution with G(ε) = ε
b
and g(ε) = 1
b
. The parameter, b,
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is used and interpreted as the degree of product differentiation1.
In our model, we assume that transactions are potentially costly for consumers.
Such a transaction cost may be required in order to make a purchase and is
independent of the number of units bought. Common examples includes the costs
of visiting a firm or ordering a delivery. To ease exposition in the main model,
we assume that transaction costs are zero in period 1, but equal to κ ∈ (0, b) in
period 2.2 This captures the fact that repeat transactions are particularly costly
for consumers and as we later show, it is the level of transaction costs in period
2, rather than period 1, that are important for consumers’ stockpiling decisions.
However, in Section 5.6, we show how this assumption can be relaxed to allow for
positive transactions costs in both periods. For simplicity, we also suppose that
all agents have a discount factor close to one, as most appropriate for products
that are purchased frequently (e.g. bottles of cola).
We consider a one-shot game with two periods. In period 1, the firm chooses its
period 1 price, p1. The firm is unable to commit to its period 2 price. Consumers
learn match values and observe the period 1 price before making period 1 purchase
and stockpiling decisions - they can choose to not buy at all, to buy one unit, or
to stockpile by buying two units. In period 2, the firm sets its period 2 price, p2.
Any remaining consumers that did not stockpile in period 1 then observe this price
and choose whether to buy one or zero units. We focus then seek an equilibrium
with equilibrium prices p∗1 and p∗2.
5.2.2 Benchmark Analysis
We first briefly examine a benchmark case where consumer stockpiling is not feas-
ible. In this case, the two periods are almost identical, apart from the transaction
1One may argue that this actually measures consumer heterogeneity. To keep the consistency
throughout the thesis, I use it to index the level of product differentiation.
2To ensure that the whole market is active, κ cannot be too large, κ < b.
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cost in period 2. In any period, a consumer will purchase one unit if his match
value exceeds the cost of purchasing. As such, consumer will buy one unit in period
1 with probability Pr(ε − pi ≥ 0) and one unit in period 2 if Pr(ε − p2 − κ ≥ 0).
Accordingly, firm’s demand in period 1 and period 2 can be written as,
Q1(p
NS
1 ) = 1−G(p1) =
b− p1
b
Q2(p
NS
2 + κ) = 1−G(p2 + κ) =
b− (p2 + κ)
b
(5.1)
After applying the usual first order condition, one then obtain the non-storage
equilibrium prices and quantity. In period 1, the firm sets p∗NS1 =
b
2
, and the
equilibrium quantity is QNS1 =
1
2
. In period 2 the firm sets p∗NS2 =
b−κ
2
and sells
QNS2 =
b−κ
2b
. It can be seen that in period 2, the firm sets lower price. This is
because the firm needs to offer a discounted price in period 2 to induce the con-
sumers to incur the transaction cost. In aggregate, the firm earns pi∗NS = (b−κ)
2+b2
4b
,
whereas the equilibrium prices are increasing in the product differentiation b, and
(weakly) decreasing in the transaction cost κ.
5.3 Equilibrium Analysis
We now start the main equilibrium analysis, where consumer stockpiling is feasible.
Section 5.2.2 covers some important preliminary features of stockpiling decisions
of consumers in period 1. Section 5.3.2 then endogenises the firm’s behaviour.
5.3.1 Consumers’ Decisions
We first characterise some features of consumer’s stockpiling decisions and demand
in period 1 for a given period 1 price, p1, and expected period 2 price, pe2. Then
we consider period 2 demand, for a given period 2 price, p2.
88
5.3.1.1 Period 1
Consider any given consumer m’s options with match value, εm, period 1 price,
p1 and expected period 2 price, pe2.
She could: i) choose to stockpile by buying two units in period 1 to gain
uSm = 2(εm − p1)
ii) not to buy in period 1, but possibly to buy one unit in period 2 to gain
u
′
m = max{εm − pe2 − κ, 0}
iii) buy one unit in period 1 and possibly to buy one unit in period 2 to gain
E(uNSm ) = (εm − p1) +max{εm − pe2 − κ, 0}
Then note the following. First, if buying in period 1 gives consumer m negative
payoffs, i.e. εm − p1 < 0, then a) stockpiling in period 1 gives consumer m a
negative payoff as well, and b) option iii) becomes dominated by option ii). Under
this circumstance, consumer m never buys in period 1, but may buy in period 2
only, depending on the period 2 price. Secondly, if εm − p1 > 0, consumer m will
never choose option ii) to buy one unit only in period 2 because this is dominated
by option i) or iii). Thus, the consumer must instead choose between i) and iii)
and so will prefer option i) to stockpile if Sm = uSm − E(uNSm ) ≥ 0. It can then be
shown that an increase in consumer m’s match value weakly increases Sm. Now,
we can state the following.
Lemma 5.1. If consumer m with εm finds it optimal to stockpile in period 1, then
so will any other consumer k with εk > εm. If consumer m with εm finds it optimal
to not stockpile then so will any other consumer l with εl < εm.
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Lemma 5.1 supports the intuition that given the price of period 1 and expected
period 2 price, whether consumer chooses to stockpile or not can be identified by
their match value. Particularly, our model predicts that the consumers that are
most likely to stockpile are those with relatively higher match values.
To proceed, it is useful to define ε¯ as the match value of marginal consumer who
is indifferent between stockpiling in period 1, and to define X(ε¯) as the resulting
level of stockpiling demand. As derived previously in (5.1), we also define Q1(.)
as the level of consumer demand in period 1 absent the effects of stockpiling, and
note that the firm’s total level of demand (observed demand) in period 1 therefore
equals Qˆ1(.) = Q1(.) +X(.). We can then state the following:
Lemma 5.2. Firm’s observed demand in period 1, Qˆ1(.), is:
Q̂i1(.) =

2Q1(p1) =
2(b−p1)
b
if ε¯ ≤ p1
Q1(p1) +X(ε¯) =
b−p1
b
+X(ε¯) if ε¯ ∈ (p1, b)
Q1(p1) =
b−p1
b
if ε¯ ≥ b
(5.2)
This describes three cases. First, if ε¯ ≤ p1, all consumers stockpile. Hence, firm’s
stockpiling demand is equal to its true period 1 demand, X(.) = Q1(.), and so
firm’s total period 1 demand equals Q̂1(.) = 2Q1(p1), where Q1(p1) coincides with
the demand in the benchmark, (5.1). If, instead, ε¯ ∈ (p1, b), then only some
consumers stockpile. Here, firm’s observed demand equals Q̂1(.) = Q1(p1) +X(ε¯)
since an aggregate of Q1(p1) consumers buy of which Q1(p1)−X(ε¯) buy one unit,
and X(ε¯) buys two units. Finally, if ε¯ ≥ b, then no consumers stockpile, and
so period 1 observed demand just corresponds to the benchmark case period 1
demand.
90
5.3.1.2 Period 2
We now move on to consider period 2 demand. Similar to period 1, we can define
Q2(.) as the level of consumer demand in period 2 absent the effects of stockpiling,
as derived previously in (5.1). We can then state the following.
Lemma 5.3. The firm’s observed demand in period 2, Q̂2, is,
Q̂i2(.) =

0 if ε¯ ≤ p1
Q2(p2 + κ)−X(ε¯) = b−(p2+κ)b −X(ε¯) if ε¯ ∈ (p1, b]
Q2(p2 + κ) =
b−(p2+κ)
b
if ε¯ ≥ b
(5.3)
If ε¯ ≤ p1, all consumers have stockpiled and so period 2 is inactive. However, if
ε¯ ∈ (p1, b), then consumers with ε ∈ (p1, ε¯] did not stockpile and so remain active.
As in the benchmark, any such consumer will then buy one unit in period 2. It
then follows that firm’s observed period 2 demand equals, Qˆ2 = Q2(p2 +κ)−X(ε¯).
If ε¯ ≥ b, no consumers stockpiled and so period 2 observed demand just equals
Qˆ2 = Q2(p2 + κ).
5.3.2 Firm’s Decisions
Using backwards induction, we now consider the firm’s equilibrium decisions. We
start from period 2 for a given level of consumer storage demand from period 1.
We then derive the equilibrium levels of stockpiling demand for a given period
1 price and expected period 2 price, X(p1, pe2), where consumers’ expectations of
period 2 prices are consistent with the equilibrium , p1 = p∗2(X). Finally, given the
equilibrium levels of stockpiling demand, we then solve for period 1 equilibrium
price.
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5.3.2.1 Period 2
From (5.3), we know the period 2 market is active only if ε¯ ∈ (p1, b]. From
Section 5.3.1.1, given the period 2 price, period 2 observed demand comprises of
those consumers that i) desire to buy in period 2 such that ε− (pe2 + κ) ≥ 0 and
ii) did not stockpile in period 1. Suppose a proportion of consumers, indexed by
X(ε¯) ∈ (0, 1], have stockpiled in period 1, such that Q1(.)−X(ε¯) consumers are
potentially active within the market in period 2. Now we can state the following
for the period 2 equilibrium,
Lemma 5.4. Suppose ε¯ ∈ (p1, b] such that period 2 market is active. Then, if
b[1−X(ε¯)]− κ ≥ 0, then the unique period 2 is achieved in equilibrium with,
p∗2(X(ε¯)) =
1
2
[b(1−X(ε¯))− κ] ≥ 0 (5.4)
and Qˆ∗2(.) = Q2(p∗2)−X(ε¯) = 12b [b(1−X(ε¯))− κ] ≥ 0
The optimal period 2 price, p∗2(X(ε¯)) is positive if X(ε¯) <
b−κ
b
. Intuitively, those
consumers that stockpiled in period 1 are the consumers with the highest match
values. Hence the demand in period 2 consists of consumers with lower match
values. It indicates that firm acquires consumer’s match values and therefore sets
period 2 discriminatory price by observing whether consumers have stockpiled and
how many consumer have stockpiled. One can find that period 2 price has the
following property. First, it is lower than period 2 equilibrium price in benchmark
case p∗NS2 =
b−κ
2
. When storage demand reduces to 0, it collapses to benchmark
case period 2 equilibrium price. Thus, it can be inferred that consumer stockpiling
is the reason of price discrimination in period 2. When stockpiling demand exists,
i.e, X > 0, different groups of consumers, identified by whether they stockpiled or
not, have differences in the match value of the same product. In addition, period
2 price is also subject to the level of κ. This is because firm need to lower period
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2 prices to attract and compensate consumers for the existence of transaction
cost, which increases consumer’s expenses to buy in period 2. Having observed
differences of consumers’ match value and the level of visit cost, firm can price
discriminatingly in period 2 market.
5.3.3 Period 1
From the last section, we learned that period 2 price is determined by the level
of stockpiling demand. In this section, we return to period 1 to examine the
formation of stockpiling demand. We then solve for period 1 equilibrium price.
5.3.3.1 Equilibrium Stockpiling Demand
Denote X(p1, pe2) as firm’s equilibrium level of stockpiling demand, where con-
sumers expectations are correct if pe1 = pe2(X). As explained below, we can now
state the following lemma.
Proposition 5.1. The unique stockpiling demand in period 1 can be expressed as
follows:
X∗(.) =

0 if p1 ≥ b+κ2
b+κ−2p1
b
if κ < p1 < b+κ2
b−p1
b
if p1 ≤ κ
(5.5)
When making the decisions of whether or not to stockpile, consumers optimally
compare between the cost of stockpiling in period 1 p1, and the cost returning to
buy a second unit in period 2 p2 + κ. This comparison is subject to the match
value of each consumer, the level of period 1 price and expected period 2 price.
Proposition 5.1 displays three different scenarios of stockpiling demand in period
1.
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First, consider the first case where no stockpiling demand is facilitated. Here, all
consumers who have purchased in period 1 find that stockpiling is less attractive
than buying just one unit. From Section 5.3.1.1, it must be the case that Sm =
uSm−E(uNSm ) < 0 ∀εm. If E(uNSm ) = max{ε−pe2−κ, 0} = ε−pe2−κ3, rearranging
yields the condition of operating zero storage demand, p1 > p2 + κ. Inserting
equilibrium period 2 prices of equation (5.4) with X = 0, shows that this case
requires p1 > b−κ2 + κ =
b+κ
2
.
Second, consider the intermediate case where X ∈ (0, Q(p1)). In this case, there
exists a consumer who is indifferent between stockpiling and buying 1 unit in each
period with Sm = uSm − E(uNSm ) = 0 ∀εm, within those who have purchased in
period 1. Rearranging yields p1 = p2(.) + κ. Substituting equation (5.4) and
isolating the expression of X yields X∗(.) = b+κ−2p1
b
and then get the condition
κ < p1 <
b+κ
2
.
Third, consider the third case where X = Q1(p1) such that all consumers who
buy one unit in period 1 also stockpile. Here, Sm < 0 ∀εm. Rearranging yields,
p1 < p2(X = Q(p1) + κ. Inserting equation (5.4) with X = Q(p1) = b−p1b shows
that this case requires p1 < κ.
5.3.3.2 Equilibrium Period 1 Price
We now move to derive the equilibrium by solving for the period 1 equilibrium
prices. Given changes of stockpiling demand in period 1 and period 2, firm’s profit
maximisation problem can be written as,
piS = p1 · [Q1(p1) +X(p∗1)] + p∗2(X∗) · [Q2(p2)−X(p∗1)] (5.6)
where firm receives period 1 demand Qˆ1 = Q1(p1) + X(.) from (5.2) and (5.5),
and (if active) sets a period 2 equilibrium price, p∗2, (5.4), and receives a period 2
3If E(uNSm ) = 0, then Sm = 2(εm − p1) < 0. In this case consumer do not buy in period 1.
The whole market is not active.
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equilibrium demand Qˆ2 = Q2(p2)−X(.) from (5.3). To start with, we first cover
the following important result.
Proposition 5.2. In any symmetric equilibrium with κ > 0, there is a positive
level of stockpiling demand.
First, note that the benchmark case with no consumer stockpiling cannot qualify
as an equilibrium when κ > 0. This is because zero stockpiling demand requires
p1 > p2 + κ. But using Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.4, one can find that the bench-
mark p∗NS1 =
b
2
< p∗NS2 + κ =
b+κ
2
implies the opposite. Hence, we now seek an
equilibrium with X∗ > 0. After defining Q∗1, Q∗2 and X∗ as the relevant quantities
evaluated at equilibrium prices, we can then state the following:
Proposition 5.3. There exists an unique equilibrium which is characterised as
follows:
i) If product differentiation is low, b < 2κ, then X∗ = Q∗1 =
1
2
and Qˆ∗2 = Q∗2−X∗ =
0, where p∗1 =
b
2
, p∗2 = 0.
ii) If product differentiation is moderate, b ∈ [2κ, 5κ
2
], then X∗ = Q∗1 =
b−κ
b
and
Qˆ∗2 = Q
∗
2 −X∗ = 0, where p∗1 = κ, p∗2 = 0.
iii) If product differentiation is high, b > 5κ
2
, then X∗ = 3κ
2b
< Q∗1 =
2b+κ
4b
and
Qˆ∗2 = Q
∗
2 −X∗ = 2b+κ4κ > 0, where p∗1 = b2 − κ4 , p∗2 = b2 − 5κ4 .
Proposition 5.3 establishes the unique equilibrium where consumers stockpile and
where the firm sets prices endogenously. Depending on the level of product differ-
entiation, there are three different cases. These can be understood as follows.
The first and the second cases suggest all consumers stockpile in equilibrium. i.e,
X∗ = Q1(p∗1) =
b−p∗1
b
. In these two cases, consider the marginal consumer who is
indifferent between stockpiling with uS ≡ 2(ε− p∗1) = (ε− p∗1) + (ε− p∗2−κ) ≡ uS.
If this consumer were to deviate from equilibrium by not stockpiling, she should
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rationally expect an equilibrium period 2 price limX∗→Q1(p∗1)p
∗
2 =
1
2
(p∗1 − κ). Now,
her benefits from not stockpiling can therefore be expressed as uNS = (ε − p∗1) +
(ε − (p∗1−κ
2
) − κ) = 2ε − 3p∗1
2
− κ
2
. Hence, this consumer will stockpile as required
in equilibrium only if uS > uNS ⇐⇒ p∗1 ≤ κ. Moreover, using a similar logic
to Proposition 5.1, this condition is sufficient for all consumers to stockpile in
equilibrium. Therefore, any equilibrium with X∗ = Q1(p∗1) requires p∗1 ≤ κ. To
derive p∗1, provided that the period 1 price is less than κ, the firm selects p1 to
maximise (5.6), where X = Q1(p1), such that (6) becomes pi = 2p1Q1 subject
to p1 ≤ κ. After applying the normal first order condition, this leads to p∗1 =
min{ b
2
, κ}.
Hence, in the first case when the product differentiation level is sufficiently low
relative to the level of transaction cost, b < 2κ, all consumers are inclined to
stockpile in an effort of avoiding the relatively high transaction cost in period 2.
This implies that the firm does not need to reduce its period 1 price to attract
consumers to stockpile and firm’s profit is unconstrained at p∗1 =
b
2
. In this case,
the equilibrium level of stockpiling demand is X∗ = Q∗1 =
1
2
In contrast, in the second case when the product differentiation level is moderate
relative to the level of transaction cost such that b ∈ [2κ, 5κ
2
]. In this case, the firm’s
profit maximisation price b
2
is bound by the p∗1 ≤ κ and therefore sets p∗1 = κ < b2
to ensure the marginal consumer who is indifferent between stockpiling and not
is just willing to stockpile with uS = uNS. In this case, the equilibrium level of
stockpiling demand is X∗ = Q∗1 =
b−κ
b
.
Finally, consider the third case with a higher level of product differentiation level
relative to the level of transaction cost, b > 5κ
2
. Here, only a strict positive
proportion of consumers with high match values stockpile in advance. This leaves
the remaining consumers with low match values being active in period 2. Hence, in
response to the consumers with relatively lower match values, the firm optimally
sets a lower price in period 2, to maintain its market demand. Consequently, as
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the period 2 price goes down, the period 1 price also falls. Intuitively, from the
discussion of Proposition 5.1, we know that X ∈ (0, Q1(.)) requires p∗1 = p∗2 + κ.
Thus, to ensure that a positive interior proportion of consumers are willing to
stockpile, we require p∗1 = p∗2 + κ, and that this price relationship then uniquely
pins down the proportion of consumers who stockpile. In particular, the appendix
then shows that p∗1 =
b
2
− κ
4
= p∗2 + κ =
b
2
− 5κ
4
+ κ and X∗ = 3κ
2b
. Finally to
ensure that equilibrium is well-defined with non-negative prices, it is necessary
that b > 5κ
2
.
The last case in which only an interior proportion of consumers stockpile can also
be understood from the perspective of a special form of BBPD. This is because
being able to stockpile actually gives firm an opportunity to use consumers’ stock-
piling behaviour as a device to perform price discrimination for the unit of the
product that will be consumed in period 2. Specifically, the firm sets period 1
price lower than the benchmark period 1 price to attract consumers with high
match values to stockpile. By doing so, the firm is able to identify different groups
of consumers with different match values from stockpiling behaviour. As a result,
period 2 market only consists of those with lower match values. Having segmen-
ted the consumers, the firm then sets a even lower period 2 price to the remaining
consumers.
5.4 Comparative Static Analysis
Before considering the welfare effects, we now analyse how the equilibrium level
of stockpiling demand, X∗, varies with product differentiation and the transaction
cost.
Corollary 5.1. In equilibrium, the level of stockpiling demand X∗ is weakly de-
creasing in the level of product differentiation, b, and increasing in the size of the
transaction cost, κ.
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Corollary 5.1 illustrates how stockpiling demand varies with respect to exogenous
market parameters.
In the first equilibrium case from Proposition 5.3 where the product differentiation
is sufficiently low relative to the level of transaction cost, b < 2κ, equilibrium
stockpiling demand is X∗ = 1
2
. This is independent with any exogenous factors.
In the second equilibrium case where the product differentiation is moderate relat-
ive to transaction cost such that b ∈ [2κ, 5κ
2
], the equilibrium stockpiling X∗ = b−κ
b
is increasing in the product differentiation level and decreasing in the transaction
cost. Intuitively, the demand function of period 1 demand and stockpiling demand
are subject to the level of product differentiation, Q1(.) = X(.) = b−p1b . As b in-
creases, both stockpiling and period 1 demand increases. Similarly, the firm sets
p∗1 = κ in this case, as the level of transaction cost goes up, both period 1 demand
and stockpiling demand go down.
In the last equilibrium case where the product differentiation is high relative to
transaction cost, b > 5κ
2
, such that some consumers stockpile, X∗ ∈ (0, Q1(.)), the
equilibrium level of stockpiling demand increases with product differentiation and
decreases with transaction cost. To get the intuition, first, consider a unit change
in product differentiation, b. HoldingX∗ constant, both period prices increase, but
the period 1 price increases by more such that p∗1 > p∗2 +κ. As a result, consumers
are less inclined to stockpile and X∗ reduces until the point where p∗1 = p∗2 + κ
is restored. Next, consider a unit change in the transaction cost, κ. Compared
to the period 1 price, the price 2 price is more responsive to the transaction cost.
Holding X∗ constant, p∗1 decreases, while p∗2 + κ increases such that p∗1 < p∗2 + κ.
As a result, consumers are more inclined to stockpile and X∗ increases until the
point where p∗1 = p∗2 + κ is restored.
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5.5 Welfare
Having characterised the equilibrium, we now consider the welfare effects. Here,
we define define the total welfare as the sum of aggregate consumer surplus, CS,
and firm profits, pi.
W (.) = CS(.) + pi(.) (5.7)
5.5.1 Benchmark
Recall from the Section 5.2.2 that in the benchmark case where stockpiling is
prohibited, the firm sets a period 1 equilibrium price, p∗NS1 =
b
2
, and a period 2
price p∗2 =
b−κ
b
, with demand Q1(.) = b−p1b , and Q2(.) =
b−(p2+κ)
b
. Equilibrium firm
profits then equal pi∗NS = p∗1Q∗1 +p∗2Q∗2 =
b2+(b−κ)2
4b
. Given the levels of transaction
costs, one can then also define consumer surplus in period 1 as CS1 =
∫ b
p∗1
Q1(p1)dp1
and consumer surplus in period 2 as CS2 =
∫ b
p∗2+κ
Q2(p2 +κ)dp2 ≡
∫ b−κ
p∗2
Q2(p2)dp2,
such that total consumer surplus equals CS∗NS = b
2+(b−κ)2
8b
. After expanding (5.7),
one then obtains W ∗NS = 3[b
2+(b−κ)2]
8b
5.5.2 Main Model
By comparing these benchmark welfare values to the welfare values evaluated at
equilibrium price p∗1, we can now consider the welfare effects of stockpiling.
Proposition 5.4. The possibility of consumer stockpiling always increases the
firm’s equilibrium profits, consumer surplus and total welfare.
Proposition 5.4 summarises the welfare effects of stockpiling. This can be under-
stood as follows.
First, consider the first equilibrium case where product differentiation is extremely
low relative to transaction cost such that b < 2κ. The prices are the same as
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the benchmark case, so no extra demand is stimulated. However, being able to
stockpile brings demand forward from period 2 to period 1. This allows consumer
to buy their period 2 unit in period 1 without incurring the transaction cost. It
therefore increases consumer surplus. Meanwhile, the firm also benefits from it
because as suggested by benchmark case, the firm needs to offer a discounted
price in period 2 to induce the consumers to incur the transaction cost. Thus, if
all consumers stockpile in period 1, the firm can sell the period 2 demand at a
higher period 1 equilibrium price. In aggregate, social welfare, which is given as
the sum of consumer surplus and firm’s profit as (5.7), increases in this case.
Second, consider the second equilibrium case where the product differentiation is
moderate relative to transaction cost such that b ∈ [2κ, 5κ
2
]. Similar to the first
case, all consumer stockpile. However, the firm now sets a lower period 1 price than
in the benchmark. Thus, consumers benefit not only from bringing forward their
consumption to avoid the transaction costs, but also from a lower price compared
to the benchmark. It can be shown in the appendix that selling at this price still
increases the firm’s profit because this price attracts more consumers to buy and
stockpile. From above, total welfare therefore increases in this case.
Finally. consider the third equilibrium case where the product differentiation is
higher relative to transaction cost such that b > 5κ
2
. The period 2 market is active
and only a proportion of consumers stockpile, while the firm sets both period 1
and period 2 prices lower than the benchmark case. The reduced prices have two
effects. First, they create more demand in both periods. These increase consumer
surplus. Second, the reduced price in period 1 attracts consumers to stockpile.
Stockpiling consumers are better from saving the transaction cost expenditure in
period 2. Thus, consumer surplus are better off. It can then be shown in the
appendix that the firm is also better off because the increased sales compensate
for the reduced prices. Hence, as both the consumers and the firm benefit, total
welfare also rises in this case.
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Proposition 5.4 can also be understood in terms of BBPD. The previous literature
suggests that the effects of price discrimination and stockpiling model is typically
complex and difficult to derive (Hendel and Nevo, 2013). But in the final stock-
piling case of our analysis, we provide a crisp and clear prediction of it. When
stockpiling is feasible, the firm sets a lower period 1 price to identify consumers
with relatively high match values by attracting them to stockpile, and increase
market demand. In period 2, after acknowledging that now only consumers with
lower match values are active, the firm then sets its period 2 price lower than its
period 1 price for these consumers in a way that benefits both the firm and the
consumers.
In other words, the firm would like to enable stockpiling rather than not while
policymakers would encourage consumers to stockpile in an effort of improving
consumer surplus and total social welfare.
5.6 Alternative Transaction Cost Assumption
It was originally assumed that consumers incur a transaction cost if they make
a purchase in period 2. We will now show how our results remain robust under
a more realistic assumption where consumers incur the transaction cost only if
they return to make a second transaction with the firm. However, in order to
maintain tractability, this weaker transaction cost assumption requires us to make
an additional assumption that the market is covered. In particular, this requires
all consumers to consume (but not purchase) a unit in each period. Formally, this
is consistent with consumers’ match values that are distributed on the interval
[a, b] where 0 < a < b and where a is large enough to ensure that consumers
always consume. Given this, option ii) in Section 5.3.1.1 becomes invalid. Any
given consumer m only chooses between i) stockpiling in period 1 with utility:
usm = 2(εm − p1) and, iii) buying 1 unit in each period with expected utility:
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E(uNSm ) = εm − p1 + (εm − p2 − t).4, depending the one that maximises their
utility. Now this extension with alternative transaction assumption coincides with
the Lemma 1 of the main model. Using the same backward induction method as
we did in the main model, it follows that the value of storage demand X(p1) the
following pricing equilibrium and welfare results under this alternative visit cost
assumption are now subject to the lower bound of the distribution of consumer’s
match value. Accordingly, our result of the welfare effects remains robust.
5.7 Conclusions
It is often observed that consumers stockpile for future consumption. What we
focus in this chapter is that how the stockpiling can be used as a device towards
BBPD and its welfare implications. Based on a storable product, we set up a two-
period monopoly. In the unique equilibrium, due to the existence of transaction
costs, consumers stockpile. Depending on the level of product differentiation, there
are two cases where all consumers stockpile and one case where a proportion of
consumers stockpile. In the latter case, where product differentiation level is high
relative to transaction cost, higher match value consumers stockpile in advance
while consumers with lower match value do not. Hence, the firm can segment
consumers according to their match value and perform BBPD.
In regards to welfare effects, We show that being able to stockpile always increases
aggregate consumer surplus and firm profits despite any potential BBPD. For the
firm, this BBPD prompts it to optimally select lower prices in a way that increases
its profits from the resulting increase in market demand. For the consumers,
their surplus increases due to i) being able to stockpile and thereby reduce their
expenditure on transaction costs, and ii) the reduced prices. Hence, policymakers
should not be concerned by such a form of price discrimination.
4It requires that a is sufficient large such that a− p1 < t.
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We hope that future research can build on our work in at least three ways. First,
further work should generalise, expand, and test out findings to develop the implic-
ations of competing market where more than one firms are in the market. Second,
future work would be useful if more consumer factors, such as uncertainty and risk
aversion, are taken into account. Finally, and more generally, we hope that future
research can build on our framework to analyse further storable product related
questions.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5.1. : Period 1 consumer’s choice can be summarised as fol-
lows: i), usm = 2(εm − p1), ii), u′m = Max{εm − pe2 − t, 0},and iii), E(uNSm ) =
(εm − p1) + Max{εm − pe2 − t, 0}. First consider if (εm − p1) < 0, then i) will
be a dominated strategy since usm < 0. Furthermore, ii) will be superior than
iii). Thus, if purchasing in period 1 gives consumer a negative payoff such that
(εm− p1) < 0, option ii), which is irrelevant to storage demand, is the dominating
strategy. On the other hand, if (εm − p1) > 0, ii) will be the dominated strategy.
Under such a case consumer will choose to stockpile if Sm = usm − E(uNSm ) > 0.
One can verify that Sm is weakly increasing in εm by taking first order derivatives
of Sm to εm, which equals to zero. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5.4. : Suppose the match value of marginal consumer ε¯ ∈
[0, b), such that firm have positive storage demand. Then one can use pi2 = p2Qˆ2(.)
with (5.3) to derive firm’s period 2 price for a given level of stockpiling demand.
Applying normal first order condition yields, p∗2(.) =
1
2
[b(1−X(ε¯))− κ] ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. : Once we have derived firm’s period 2 equilibrium
price, we can use it to derive period 1 equilibrium level stockpiling demand. Firstly,
consider consumers’ stockpiling decisions. From Section 5.3.1, we know consumer
optimally compares the cost of stockpiling and the cost of waiting until period
2. If Sm = uSm − E(uNSm ) = 0, consumers are indifferent between stockpiling. By
construction, this indifference requires p1 = p2(X) + κ.
In the case of no stockpiling demand that is suggested by the top line of (5.5). In
this case, X = 0, such that no consumer finds it optimal to stockpile. It must
then follow that p1 > p2(0) + κ. From (5.4), p∗2 =
b−κ
2
when X = 0. Therefore,
this case requires, p1 > b−κ2 + κ, rearranging yields p1 >
b+κ
2
.
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Second, consider another ‘corner case’ in which all consumer stockpiles. In this
case, all consumer who has bought in period 1 finds it optimal to stockpile, such
that Q1(.) = X(.) = b−p1b . It must then follow that p1 < p2(
b−p1
b
) + κ. By
construction, it requires p1 < κ .
Lastly, consider the intermediate case in which some consumer stockpiles. In this
case, there exists an unique level of equilibrium stockpiling, X ∈ (0, Q1(.)), such
that p1 = p2(X)+κ holds for firm. To obtain such X, one can insert p∗2 from (5.4)
and isolate the expression of X to yield X = b+κ−2p1
b
.
Finally, note that the levels of stockpiling and associated conditions in (5.5) are
continuous when p1 > 0
Proof of Proposition 5.3. : a) If b < 5κ
2
such that all consumer stockpiles,
firm’s profit maximisation function can be written as,
pi = p1[Q1(.) +X(.)]
where Q1(.) = X(.) = b−p1b . Applying the normal first order condition yields,
p1 =
b
2
. Note that, for all consumer stockpiling to be facilitated, it also requires
p1 < κ. Therefore, if b < 2κ, firm charges period 1 equilibrium price, p∗1 =
b
2
. If
2κ < b < 5κ
2
, firm charges p∗1 = κ.
b). If b > 5κ
2
, firm’s profit maximisation problem can be written as,
piS = p1 · [Q1(p1) +X(p∗1)] + p∗2(X∗) · [Q2(p2)−X(p∗1)] (5.8)
where Q1(p1) = b−p1b and Q2(p2) =
b−(p2+κ)
b
, and where p∗2(X∗) and X(p∗1) are
given by (5.4) and (5.5).
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After solving the first order condition of (6) with respect to p15, one obtains
p∗1 =
b
2
− κ
4
Together with p∗2 =
b
2
− 5κ
4
, X∗ = 3κ
2b
, pi∗ = (2b−κ)
2
8b
+ κ
2
b
. This case requires p∗2 ≥ 0
or b ≥ (5κ/2).
Proof of Corollary 5.1. : The proof can be straightforwardly done by taking
first order derivatives of X∗ w.r.t z ∈ {b, κ} respectively.
Proof of Proposition 5.4. : From Section 5.2.2, we know equilibrium price of
benchmark case is p∗NS1 =
b
2
, and p∗NS2 =
b−κ
2
. In this case, firm’s profit function
is pi∗NS = p∗NS1 Q1(.) + p∗NS2 Q2(.) ==
(b−κ)2+b2
4b
. From Section 5.1, we know the
consumer surplus of benchmark case is CS∗NS = b
2+(b−κ)2
8b
, and total welfare of
the benchmark case is 3[b
2+(b−κ)2]
8b
.
If stockpiling is feasible. From Section 5.3.3.2, there are three different cases,
a). If b < 2κ, all consumer stockpiles while firm charges p∗1 =
b
2
. In this case the
profit function is pi∗ = 2p∗1[Q1(.)] =
b
2
. It can then be inferred that being able to
stockpile gives firm more profits from pi∗−pi∗NS = κ(2b−κ)
4b
≥ 0. Consumer’s welfare
is given by CS∗ = 2
∫ b
p∗1
Q1(.) =
b
4
. It can then be inferred that in this case being
able to stockpile gives consumer more surplus from CS∗ − CS∗NS = κ(2b−κ)
8b
> 0.
From above, it follows that social welfare also increases in this case.
b). If 2κ ≤ b ≤ 5κ
2
, all consumer stockpiles while firm charges p∗1 = κ. In this case,
the profit function is pi∗ = 2p∗1[Q1(.)] =
2κ(b−κ)
b
. It can then be inferred that being
5The second order condition is given by, ∂pi
2
∂p21
= − 4b < 0
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able to stockpile gives firm more profits from pi∗−pi∗NS = [(b− 5κ2 )+
√
7
2
κ][(b− 5κ
2
)−
√
7
2
κ]
−2b >
0 if 2κ ≤ b ≤ 5κ
2
. Consumer’s welfare is given by CS∗ = 2
∫ b
κ
Q1(.) =
(b−κ)2
b
. It can
then be inferred that when 2κ ≤ b ≤ 5κ
2
, being able to stockpile gives consumer
more surplus from CS∗ − CS∗NS = 3[(b− 7κ6 )+
√
7
6
κ][(b− 7κ
6
)−
√
7
6
κ]
4b
> 0. From above, it
follows that social welfare also increases in this case.
c). If b > 5κ
2
, some consumer stockpiles while firm charges period 1 price p∗1 =
b
2
− κ
4
,
and period 2 price p∗2 =
b
2
− 5κ
4
. Firm’s profit maximisation function is now
given by (5.6) and equals pi∗ = (2b−κ)
8b
+ κ
2
b
. It is straightforward to find that
pi∗ − pi∗NS = 7κ2
8b
> 0.
For consumer surplus, If b > 5κ
2
, in equilibrium where there is a strict positive
proposition of consumer stockpile with X∗ = 3κ
2b
∈ [0, Q1(p1)], we have p∗1 = p∗2 +κ,
CS =
∫ b
p∗1
[Q1(p1) +X
∗]dp1 +
∫ b
p∗2+κ
[Q2(p2 + κ)−X∗]dp2
=
∫ b
p∗1
Q1(p1)dp1 +
∫ b
p∗2+κ
Q2(p2)dp2
=
(κ+ 2b)2
16b
as p∗1 = p∗2 + κ, and where p∗1 =
b
2
− κ
4
, p∗2 =
b
2
− 5κ
4
, X∗ = 3κ
2b
, Q1(p1) = b−p1b ,
Q2(p2) =
b−(p2+κ)
b
.
Given the total consumer surplus of non-stockpiling benchmark case is CS∗NS =
b2+(b−κ)2
b
CS − CS∗NS = κ(8b− κ)
16b
This is strictly positive because b > 5κ
2
.
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It then follows that both profits and consumer surplus increase, and therefore
welfare, in this case.
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